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The question is no longer whether the first move must be made in order
to accomplish equality within our society; the question has become and,
possibly has always been, who has the power and duty to make those
moves so as to advance the accomplishments of that equality.
- The Honorable Damon J. Keith'
1. Davis v. School Dist of Pontiac, 309 F. Supp. 734,742 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
A PARADIGM FOR EQUALIT1
I. INTRODUCTION
As the twentieth century yields to the twenty-first, DamonJ. Keith,
United States Court of Appeals Judge for the Sixth Circuit,
paradigmatically exemplifies, in both his life and jurisprudence, a single
individual's effective contribution to the struggle for equality. Despite
hegemony's2 seemingly overwhelming power to both create and
maintain material subordination for people of color, Judge Keith has
effected socioeconomic change. Despite building political pressures that
continue to repeal the gains of the Civil Rights Movement, Judge Keith
has upheld and cogently justified programs that distribute power more
fairly. His legal opinions reflect a transformative legal ideology that has
not only impacted the material conditions of people of color, women
and citizens generally, but has also withstood both political attack and
reversal on appeal.
Judge Keith has set an example for those who will continue the
struggle for equality. As analyzed in this Article, Judge Keith has gone
2. Hegemonic theories appear throughout this Article. In examining domination
as a combination of both physical coercion and ideological control, "Antonio Gramsci,
an Italian neo-Marxist theorist," developed the concept of hegemony. See Kimberle
Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retmchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidisrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331,1350 (1988) [hereinafter Race, Reform,
and Retrvnchmen1. "Hegemony is a system of attitudes and beliefs which permeate both
popular consciousness and ruling class ideology." Id. It "reinforces [the] existing social
arrangements and convinces the dominated classes that the existing order is
inevitable," unchangeable, and natural. Ia Critical Legal Studies (CLS) scholars have
used the concept of hegemony to track the continued legitimacy of American social
arrangements. See id According to these theorists, the unequal distribution of wealth
and resources within American social arrangements has historically sustained its
legitimacy by inducing the poor to consent and accept their own oppression as natural
and obvious. See id For example, Robert Gordon, legal historian, argues that the legal
system is at its best when it appears uncontroversial, neutral, and acceptable. See id.
(citing Robert Gordon, New Developments in LDgal Theog, in the Poltics of Law Unfreenxg
LDgalRea: CriticalApproaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 195 (1987)). This is the
most potent form of hegemony because "both the dominant and dominated classes
believe that the existing order" is inescapable. See Race, Reform, and Retrenchment, supra,
at 1349-51 (citing Gordon, supra, at 286); see also James Boyle, The Poltis of Reason:
Critical LeDal Theo0 and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685 (1985). In addition
to hegemonic theories and other CLS theories, Professor Kimberle Williams
Crenshaw's article Race, Reform, and Retrenchment provides the ideological underpinning
for this article. The theories Professor Crenshaw explores in her article are applied to
both the life and legal opinions of Judge Keith in this Article.
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beyond the abolition of the substantive conditions of Black
subordination. He has devoted his legal tenure to the eradication of
inequality for all people of color, women, and citizens geaerally.
Judge Keith has demonstrated that in order for future leaders to
resist and overcome the co-opting force of legal reform and the empty
rhetoric of equal opportunity, they must develop and maintain a distinct
political consciousness grounded in the material subordination of Black
people.4 History has demonstrated that the Black community's most
valuable political assets have been its ability to assert a collective identity
and to name its collective political reality. Judge Keith is an example of
such an asset. Judge Keith's legal philosophy is grounded in the reality
of the oppressed. He has consistently resisted the temptation to separate
himself from the greater collective of Black people and assert himself
as an "individual," in the American tradition, in order to curry favor
with majority society and to make himself more palatable to them.
Instead, he has consistently identified himself with die collective
struggle of Black people. Unlike some Black leaders, Judge Keith has
transcended the "I" and embraced the "we." He has and will continue
to speak to, for, and about people of color, women, and justice in
general.
This Article analyzes Judge Keith's contributions to equality in both
his life and jurisprudence. In Part I, I discuss the centradity of racist
hegemony in our world in order to place in sharp relief Judge Keith's
personal triumph and the effectiveness of his legal opinions. The full
hegemonic force of race not only informs Judge Keith as a person, but
also the historical context of his cases, and the political climate in which
he adjudicates. The same fortitude that has empowered Judge Keith to
triumph over hegemony inspires his adherence to the struggle for both
justice and equality for everyone.
In Part II, I discuss how the hegemonic force of race has structured
Judge Keith's lived reality. Additionally, I demonstrate how Judge
Keith's own experiences with racist hegemony have produced in him a
3. I acknowledge that many scholars have argued that "Black," as opposed to
African-American, references a pan-African inclusiveness. See Black isBack, THENEW
YORKER, Oct. 30, 1995, at 33. However, in this Article, I use 'BlacI?' and "African
American" interchangeably and both are meant to reference a pan-African
inclusiveness.
4. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw examines and discusses the formulation of this
political consciousness in Race, Reform, and Retrenchment, srpra note 2.
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keen awareness of power imbalance, whether it is between Whites and
persons of color, men and women, or citizen and government
Moreover, Judge Keith's personal struggle paradigmatically exemplifies
Black Americans' power and ability to resist the brunt of hegemony
successfully s
In Part 11, I analze how anti-discrimination law has produced two
conflicting visions and goals: the restrictive view of equality as process
and the expansive view of equality as a result.6 I also argue that the
world view of the interpreter informs his/her adherence to the
restrictive or expansive view, as opposed to some self-evident, neutral
principle.' I further argue thatJudge Keith has consistently and willingly
embraced the challenge of the expansionist vision by developing a legal
ideology grounded in the material and historical reality of the oppressed.
In Part IV, I analyze Baker. Ci ofDetmit, Stamps v. Detroit Edison,9
Davis v. School Distict of the City of Pontiac,0 and Garrett v. City of
Hamtramck,"i as examples ofJudge Keith successfully using a historical
approach emblematic of the expansionist vision. By fully elaborating the
facts of these cases within their greater historical context, Judge Keith
has exposed racism as societal policy, not the product of individual bad
actors. Furthermore, Judge Keith's use of a historical approach has
negated the possibility of drawing a false symmetry of despair between
Whites harmed by remedial efforts and Blacks harmed by America's
racist past. Additionally, each of these cases demonstrates Judge Keith's
willingness to summon the institutional power of the courts to effect
equality.
In Part V, I demonstrate that in addition to a legal sensibility keenly
sensitive to injustice generally, and sensitive to race specifically, Judge
5. Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. described the kind of strength and power
Judge Keith has exhibited when he told a group of white segregationist "[wje will wear
you down with our capacity for suffering." HOUSTON A. BAKER JR., CRITICAL
MEMORY AND THE BLACK PUBLIC SPHERE, IN PuBLIC CULTURE 25 (1994).
6. Professor Crenshaw develops the idea of the restrictive and expansive views in
Race, Reform, and Retenchment, pna note 2, at 1336. 1 have used Crenshaw's restrictive
and expansive theories to analyze the effectiveness ofJudge Keth's legaljurisprudence
in the struggle for equality.
7. See id at 1344.
8.483 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
9. 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
10. 309 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
11.394 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
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Keith has also embraced the expansionist view in the struggle for
gender equality and summoned the full power of the court to ameliorate
the substantive power imbalance between men and women. In his
dissent in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 2 Judge Keith employed his
signature method of adjudicating- exhausting the facts within the
historical context of gender inequality. In addition to exposing the
majority opinion by exhausting the record, Judge Keith (1) established
that societal norms cannot set the standard for permissible sexual
harassment in the workplace; 3 (2) introduced the reasonable woman
standard in assessing the severity of sexually offensive conduct in order
to avoid drawing a false symmetry of power between women and men
and to avoid masking the power imbalance between the two;'4 (3)
rejected the notion that women in "blue collar" environments
voluntarily assume the risk of such exposure;' 5 and (4) summoned the
institutional power of the courts to effect the vision of Title VII,
workplace equality.'
6
In Part VI, I demonstrate howJudge Keith has reached beyond the
subjectivity of his own life to create a more equitable world, particularly
in situations involving governmental abuse of power against its citizens
and his adherence to "equal justice under the law." Even in the face of
peril and political pressure from the office of the presidency, Judge
Keith used the same fortitude that enabled him to triumph over
hegemony to protect the rights of every citizen from the government's
uninvited ear. In addition, in Part VI, I provide two examples of Judge
Keith's adherence to fairness and the rights of every citizen to a fair
triaL
Finally, in part VII, I argue thatJudge Keith exemplifies the most
compelling reasons for diversity on the bench. His presence on the
bench manifests that racial diversity among judges promotes, rather
than undermines, impartiality."7 As an African-American,. Judge Keith
promotes impartiality because his presence on the bench negates the
possibility of any viewpoint, perspective, or set of values that is not
12. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
13. See id. at 626.
14. See id.
15. Seeid
16. See id. at 627.
17. See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, JudgFng the Judges: Radal Diversiy, Impartialty and
Representation on Slate Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95 (1997).
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informed by the brunt of hegemony from persistently dominating legal
decision making. Furthermore, Judge Keith has demonstrated that
minority judges whose reality has been informed by racist hegemony
not only decrease both racial and gender bias in the courts, but also
increase the level of sensitivity to injustice generally. Judge Keith's
judicial legacy exemplifies a greater sensitivity to all injustices because
he has experienced and survived first-hand struggles with American
hegemony.
II. HEGEMONY: THE CREATION OF THE OTHER
[A] page of history is worth a volume of logic.
- Oliver W. Holmes, Jr. 8
The centrality of hegemony in our world and Judge Keith's life
inspires his keen sensitivity to power imbalance. 9 It also provides the
historical and political backdrop for his life and the cases discussed in
Parts IV and V of this Article. Moreover, the seemingly overwhelming
power of hegemony brings the effectiveness of Judge Keith's methods
18. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
19. As an example of racism's enormously destructive power and the uniqueness
of the African American experience consider No other ethnic group is (1) unable to
identify with its particular country of origin and (2) forced therefore to identify with
a continent. So, for example, the Irish mayidentify as Irish American, whereas African
Americans identify with a continent in lieu of a particular country on the African
content African Americans' forced entry into this country has erased their history.
In articulating the uniqueness of the African American experience, Justice
Marshall stated:
[Tihe racism of our society has been so pervasive that none, regardless of
wealth or position, has managed to escape its impact. The experience of
Negroes in America has been different in kind, not just in degree, from that
of other ethnic groups. It is not merely the history of slavery alone but also
that a whole people were marked as inferior by the law. And that mark has
endured.
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 400 (1978) (Marshall, J. dissenting).
As further evidence of hegemony's ability to create a power imbalance between
Whites and Blacks, the percentage of Blacks in povertyis twice that of Whites, as is the
unemployment rate. And the median income for African-American households is
$15,000 less than that for White households. Deirdre Shesgreen, TbisFamiExepfe:
the FightforEqmay Saner, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept 5,1999, at A9.
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of adjudicating and contributions to the struggle for equality into sharp
relief. An analysis of the man and his contributions necessitates a
historical examination of race.
According to hegemonic theory,20 the ruling class legitimizes the
current distribution of power by peddling a ruling class world view that
attracts and entices subordinated Whites. Historically, ruling class White
elites have successfully solidified their interests with subordinated
Whites through the institution of racism. Racism builds a consensus
among Whites about both Whiteness and Blackness by defining and
privileging membership in the White community.2 1 Racism designates
Blacks as the ultimate "other," whose interests are diametrically
opposed to those who identify-by virtue of color and/or
culture-with the dominant class. Racism creates an illusion of White
solidarity because many Whites, regardless of their class or gender, will
align their interests with those of the dominant class and dissociate
themselves from the "other" as much and as quickly as possible.'
20. See supra note 2.
21. In examining the ability of race to unite diverse White interests, Illian Smith
states:
When taxicab drivers, and store owners, bankers, farmers, Christian
ministers, doctors, politicians, patients in mental hospitals and their
attendants, writers, university presidents, union members and mill owners,
garbage collectors and Rotarians, rich and poor, men and women, unite in
common worship and common fear of one idea we know it has come to
hold deep and secret meanings for each of them, as different as are the
people themselves. We know it has woven itself around fantasies at levels
difficult for the mind to touch, until it is a part of each man's internal defense
system, embedded like steel in his psychic fortifications. And, like the little
dirty rag doll that an unhappy child sleeps with, it has acquired inflated values
that extend far beyond the rational concerns of economics and government,
or the obvious profits and losses accruing from the white-supremacy system,
into childhood memories long repressed.
LILLIAN SMITH, KILLERS OF THE DREAM 80 (W.W. Norton 1994) (1949), quoted in
Anthony Paul Farley, The Black Bod# as Fetih 06'ea, 76 OR. L. REV. 457, 486 (1997).
22. The urge to dissociate oneself from the powerless--namely Black
people-and to associate oneself with the powerful-namely White people-is not
restricted to classes of White people. On the contrary, the same phenomenon lies at
the heart of the immigrant experience and the assimilation process. In describing this
magnetic gravitational pull toward power, and simultaneous disassociation with the
powerless, comedian Richard Pryor stated that immigrants became American "by
learning to how to say nigger." Richard Pryor, "That Nigger's Craz34' (Reprise MS
2241,1974); see alo Edward A. Delgado-Romero, The Face ofRadsmJ. 0 F COUNSELING
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The hegemonic force of race defines White as virtuous, "good,
hard-working and human," and Black as virtueless, "lazy, unemployed,
criminal and less-than-human." Through this definitional process,
Black subjugation appears natural, deserved, and "just the way things
are." Furthermore, the seemingly natural state of Black subjugation is
further supported because many Whites willingly embrace a shared
consensus that Black oppression is legitimate, if not natural, and that
Blacks are worthy objects of antipathy and coercion. This is where
consensus and coercion come together: ideology convinces one group
that the coercive domination of another is legitimate.2 4 As Michel
Foucault comments "power is tolerable only on condition, that it mask
a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide
its own mechanism."
'2
White consensus in Black subordination is a political operative in
American history. American history is rife with examples where Black
interests in the redistribution of power have been sacrificed so that
different groups of Whites could settle disputes and establish or
reestablish White solidarity.
& DEv. 23-25 (Winter 1999) (stating that a recently arrived Columbian immigrant's
process of erasing his past and becoming American involved learning the word
"nigger"). As an example of how long this gravitational pull has endured for all
immigrant groups, in 1920 W.E.B. Dubois wrote in "The Souls of White Folk:"
America, Land of Democracy, wanted to believe in the failure of democracy
so far as darker peoples were concerned. Absolutely without excuse she
established a caste system ... and she is at times heartily ashamed even of
the large number of "new" white people whom her democracy has admitted
to place and power. Against this surging forward of Irish and German, of
Russian Jew, Slav and "dago" her social bars have not availed, but against
Negroes she can and does take her unflinching and immovable stand... She
trains her immigrants to this despising of "niggers" from the day of their
landing, and they carry and send the news back to the submerged classes in
the fatherlands.
W.E.B. Dubois, TheSouls fhite Folkr, from DARKWATER: VOICES FROMWrrHIN THE
VEiL (1920), repdnted in 1 THE SEVENTH SON: THE THOUGHT AND WRTING OF
W.E.B. DUBOIS 500 (ulius Lester ed., 1971).
23. John A. Powell, The 'Tadng" of Amican Sodety: Race Funeioning as a Verb Before
Signng as aNoun, 15 LAW. & INEQ. 99,113 (1997).
24. See Race, Reform, and Retrenchment, iura note 2, at 1358.
25. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 86 (1990).
26. Derrick Bell has referred to this historical hegemonic pattern as the "Principal
of Involuntary Sacrifice." DERRICK BELL, RACE RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 2
(1990). Bell provides several examples of how slave holders from the seventeenth
11692001]
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In sum, the ability of race to unite White interests across class and
party lines brought about the demise of the First Radical
Reconstruction. Although Whites had clearly identifiable class
differences, those conflicts were resolved in order to maintain the
material subordination of Blacks. It is ironic that the same Principle of
Involuntary Sacrifice that brought about the end of the First
Reconstruction is the same principle that brought about the end of the
Second Reconstruction as demonstrated below. The GOP's creation of
a populist hegemony provides a contemporary example and also sets the
political climate for the cases discussed in this Article.
Despite shameless posturing as the all-inclusive politicad party in the
century onward used race to maintain non-slaveholding White support. For example,
slavery, and its consequent cheap labor damaged non-slave holding Whites. However,
non slave holding Whites restrained their challenge to slavery because they willingly
embraced a common interest with the slave holders in Black subordination. Thus, the
hegemonic power of race had convinced even poor Whites to support a system that
disadvantaged them economically. As Bell put it, "racial privilege could and did serve
as a compensation for class disadvantage." Id at 31; ree alsoJ. OAKE;, THE RULING
RACE: A HISTORY OFAMERICAN SLAVEHOLDERS 141 (1982) (quoting the Richmond
Enquirer a decade before the Civil War stating "[m] this country alone does perfect
equality of civil and social privilege exist among the white population, and it exists
solely because we have black slaves." And "[flreedom is not possible without
slavery.").
As another example, the Tilden Hayes Compromise of 1877 demonstrates the
ability of racism to transcend and resolve class and political antagonism between
opposing groups of Whites through a compromise that victimizes and vilifies Blacks.
BELL, sura, at 32-34. By 1876, the federal government had not stopped Whites from
regaining political control over the South and much of the North; thereby, sounding
the demolition of Radical Reconstruction. Scandal and differing views on economic
issues had fragmented Republicans; however, their resolve to end their involvement
in Southern affairs united them as long as those terms would insure continued
development of business interests in the South.
Samuel Tilden, a Republican, had won a plurality of votes and seemed to have
won the electoral count by one vote. But the returns from three southern states, South
Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana were challenged. After a recount failed to resolve the
challenge, a special electoral commission was formed. Eight of the fifteen members
were Republicans and each disputed issue was resolved in favor of the Republicans by
a strict party vote of eight to seven. The Democrats did not dispute these resolutions
because both Democrats and Republicans agreed that "if the Republican Hayes was
elected, the national administration would withdraw the remaining federal troops from
the South and would do nothing to prevent popularly elected Democratic governors
from taking office in the three states (South Carolina, Florida, and Lo.4uisiana) which
were still controlled by Republicans. Id at 2.
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2000 presidential election," the GOP's formulation of a populist
hegemony, otherwise known as "playing the race card,"' exemplifies
ruling class deflection of class antagonism through the further
victimization and vilification of Blacks. During the Second
Reconstruction, the gains of the civil rights era such as busing, nominal
residential integration and affirmative action have placed the core of the
New Deal coalition, namely Blacks and working and middle class
Whites, in bitter competition over jobs, schools, neighborhoods29 and
in a broader sense over intangibles such as prestige, authority and social
space.3 Moreover, racial tensions in the New Deal coalition are further
exacerbated by (1) race conscious remedial measures that clash with
White working class-interests; and (2) the growth of suburbia, which has
established a jurisdictional and geographic boundary between White
counties and dark cities.
The GOP's once opportunistic rush to the rescue of "victimized"
and "innocent" White males has provided the party with a greatly
needed cosmetic facelift 3' Once viewed as the party of the wealthy and
corporate America, the GOP has used race and taxes to capitalize on
the racial tensions within the New Deal coalition.32 By appropriating the
27. See Gail Collins, GOP's Summer of Love, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2000, at A21.
28. The following are two widely publicized examples of the GOP play of the
"race card": (1) Ronald Reagan's condemnation of the "Chicago welfare queen;" and
(2) George Bush's use of Willie Horton to represent the depraved criminal. See
KENNETH O'REILLY, NIXON'S PIANO: PRESIDENTS AND RACIAL POLITICS FROM
WASHINGTONTO CLINTON 360, 381-88 (1995). "It is not coincidence that the images
evoked are simultaneously abhorrent and Black." Powell, sura note 23, at 110.
29. Neoconservative scholar Thomas Sowell, Senior Fellow at Stanford
University's Hoover Institution, suggests civil rights policies, like affirmative action,
have prompted the growing popularity of White hate groups. See THOMAS SOWELL,
CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC ORREALITY? 90 (1984). Sowell observes that "[e]armarked
benefits for Blacks provide some of these hate groups' strongest appeals to Whites."
Race, Reform, and Retrenchment, supra note 2, at 1331 n.34 (citing Thomas Sowell).
30. See Richard Goldstein, Whiny Wbite Gjs, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 1995,
at 25.
31. Race politics and the successful manipulation of wedge-issues have enabled
the GOP to win five of the seven past presidential elections and, most importantly, to
enact upwardly redistributive economic polices for its most influential constituency,
the affluent See THOMfAS EDSALL, THE IMPACr OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON
AMERICAN POLITICS 172,220-22 (1992).
32. In summarizing a Federalist Society Meeting, Stanley Fish articulated the
neoconservative credo as follows:
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language and posture of political oppression, the GOP became the
advocate and defender of a new conservative egalitariardsm, namely
those Whites who feel "victimized" by remedial efforts to more fairly
distribute power.33 Under the GOP schematic, Blacks, as opposed to the
ruling classes, are the reason for the perceived decline in White working
and middle class material conditions3M
This new conservative egalitarianism singles out race conscious
remedial measures as a primary threat to a democratic political system.
[A]n emphasis on group rights (I am entitled to special treatment because I
am black or Hispanic or female or gay) leads to the de-emphasis of individual
achievement (my fate is the result of my sex, race, or ethnic affiliation and
not of my abilities or lack of ability) and to a society in which one competes
not for prizes but for the status of most victimized (my disadvantages are
greater than yours and therefore my rewards, or spoils, should be greater
too). It is because we now glorify victims rather than heroes and prize
sensitivity over character that we live in a world of affirmative acion (where
you believe you deserve something before you have done an3thing); or
multiculturaism (where universal and objective norms are replaced by the local
norms of insular groups and anything you do is all right so long as; everyone
you hang out with does it too); of feminism (where, in a new form of
paternalism, your gender gives you a leg up rather than an equal chance); of
riminal dghts (where the judiciary is more solicitous of the repeat offender
than of the men and women he has robbed and killed); of we'arv (where, by
removing incentives for effort, the state destroys the spirit of self-
improvement and produces an ethic of dependency); of poltical correaness
(where you are penalized for calling a spade a spade and pressure-i to adopt
a vocabulary that offends no one and says nothing); of runaway damage awards
(where entrepreneurship is discouraged by a tort system that turns your every
action into a potential lawsuit.
Stanley Fish, At the Federalist Sodety, 39 HOW. L.J. 719, 719-720 (1996).
33. Thomas Edsall argues thatin 1983, when the Republicans realized they needed
70% of the White male vote to offset the Black majorities of the Democrats, Lee
Atwater, who perfected the parade of Black horribles (Le. quotas, taxes, special
interests, welfare, Willie Horton, and the death penalty), outlined a plan for the
Reagan-Bush reelection committee. According to Edsall, Atwater realized that
although populists were liberal on economics, they were staunchly o:nservative on
social issues. See EDSALL, supra note 31, at 220-22.
34. See Ann Devroy, Cl'nton OrdersAffirmaiveAction Retiew, At Stak~e: Pinks and
PoliticalBase, THE WASH. POST, Feb. 24,1995, at Al. Devroy wrote "that the GOP will
try to use the issues of racial preferences to slice into the multiracial coalition that
traditionally has supported Democrats. White males in the last election generally
favored the GOP, and Republicans want to keep them with arguments that the GOP
is 'colorblind' while Democrats give minorities unfair advantages." Id
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By embracing the need for "equal opportunity" and strictly color-blind
policies, this ideology vehemently opposes race conscious remedial
measures in job selection, government contracting, and university
admissions. Most importantly, this ideology casts the use of taxes as the
essence of a coercive federal bureaucracy inandating, regulating, and
legislating social, cultural, and racial change.
By making racially laden socialissues the centerpiece of the political
agenda under the guise of a new conservative egalitarianism, the GOP
has seized the populist vote. Key White voters have abandoned their
former allegiance to a coalition of the dominated and joined a coalition
of the ruling in part because the GOP has successfully persuaded them
that (1) federal taxation was used as a means to redistribute hard earned
wages to the lazy in general, and Blackwelfare recipients specifically; (2)
the thrust of federal regulation was diminishing their collective ability
to exclude Black people from their schools, neighborhoods, jobs, and
other formerly White enclaves; and (3) federal expenditures were
subsidizing enormouslywasteful programs that encouraged dependency,
sloth, and a fundamental breakdown of American family values. The
transformation of former Democrats agonized over race-freighted
issues into "Reagan Democrats" or presidential Republicans has enabled
the GOP to rally a political consensus for conservative retrenchment
and to enact upward economic distribution.'
III. HEGEMONY AND THE LuFE TRIUMPH OF JUDGE KEITH
"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience. ' 36
"Sometimes the reasons people give for taking a position are
just window dressing, good for public display but only
incidental to the heart of the matter, which is the state of their
hearts. 37
35. In a tragic note of irony, the gains made in both the First and Second
Reconstruction have been systemically sacrificed in order to maintain ruling class
interests through White solidarity. See BELL, sbra note 26, at 31.
36.JUSTICEOLIVERWENDELLHOLMiES, THE COMMON LAW I (Little, Brown and
Company 1923) (1881).
37. Fish, i ra note 32, at 735.
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Mhe scientistnever completely succeeds in makinghimselfinto
a pure spectator of the world, for he cannot cease to live in the
world as a human among other humans... and his scientific
concepts and theories necessarily borrow aspects of their
character and texture from his untheoized, spontaneously lived
experience.
The hegemonic force of race has structured Judge Keith's lived
reality. For him, racial domination is reality, not a hypothetical and not
something that can be taken for granted. The full hegemonic force of
race informs Judge Keith as a person, the historical context of his cases,
and the political climate in which he adjudicates. More importantly,
Judge Keith's own experiences with the hegemonic force of racism have
produced in him a keen awareness of power imbalance, whether it is
between Whites and persons of color, men and women, or citizen and
government.
In witnessing how Judge Keith's experiences as an African-
American have produced his sensitivity and unyielding commitment to
equality, Justice Stephen Breyer stated:
I cannot tell you just where, in his background, he learned
to combine so effectively "head" and "heart." Perhaps that
ability reflects, in part, his own early experiences as the son of
a Ford foundry worker, where he learned, as he put it, about an
auto worker's need "to drag his sore bones out of bed on a
freezing January day to go off and feed his family." Perhaps,
too, it reflects his experience of the evils of segregation.39
For Judge Keith, discrimination has not been an isolated incident,
but rather societal policy over which he has triumphed. In 1943, having
graduated from West Virginia State,' a predominantly BLack college,
Judge Keith was drafted into the segregated U.S. Army.41 He served for
two years in an "all-colored" unit, eventually becoming a staff sergeant.
38. DAVID ARBRAM, THE SPELL OF THE SENSUOUS: PERCEPTION AND
LANGUAGE IN A MORE-THAN-HUMAN WORLD (1996).
39. Justice Stephen Breyer, Le/e, 42 WAYNE L. REV. i (1996).40. EdwardJ. Littlejohn, DamonJerome Keith Layer-JudgeHumanitarian, 42 WAYNE
L. REV. 321, 323 (1996).
41. See id
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Although he possessed a college degree, Judge Keith was inducted as a
private, the military's lowest rank, andwas assigned to the quartermaster
corps.42 In reflecting on the American military's racist policies, Judge
Keith stated "[w]e drove trucks and took care of the other soldiers'
supplies. . .. Every single officer in out 'all-colored' outfit was
white-captains, the lieutenants-we had no black officers.?"4
Judge Keith's experiences with American hegemony in its military
motivated his legal career. After witnessing German POWs being
treated better than African American servicemen in the segregated U.S.
Army during World War II, Judge Keith decided to pursue the law.'
Upon returning homeJudge Keith noted the irony of risking his life for
a country that simultaneously denied him equality:
I served my country, but when I returned, I still had to ride on
the back of the bus, drink from separate water fountains and
use separate bathrooms. I thought, is this what I've been
fighting for? Have I been laying down my life to come back to
this world of Jim Crows and racists?45
In 1949, Judge Keith received his legal education at Howard
University School of Law,4 where he was groomed by and among legal
scholars who possessed both intellectual fervor and an unyielding
commitment to an expansive vision of anti-discrimination law. These
legends included James N. Nabrit, Jr., who later became Dean of
Howard Law School and then President of Howard; George E. C.
Hayes; William H. Hastie, who later became Chief Judge of the Third
42. See id
43. Id. at 324.
44. SeeLINNWASHINGTON, BLACKJUDGES ONJUSTICE 113 (1994). One ofJudge
Keith's mentors, Charles Hamilton Houston, chief architect and engineer of the
NAACP's legal strategy to dismantle Jim Crow, remarked on his similar experience of
having served his country in war to return only to his country's segregated reality.
Damon J. Keith, NewAfdcan-Ameican Trailbatm Needed, DET. LEGAL NEwS, Sept. 15,
1993, at 1. Upon his return to civilian life, "Houston reflected upon the hostility
expressed by a White patron who was forced to sit near him in a dinner car on a
passenger train. See id Houston stated: "I felt damned glad I had not lost my life
fighting for this country." Id
45. Jim Dyer, Damon Keith Wins HonorNamedforFiend, Hero, DET. NEM, May 7,
1997.
46. Littlejohn, u.tpra note 40, at 324-25.
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Circuit Court of Appeals; Charles Hamilton Houston; Thurgood
Marshall, who later became a United States Supreme CourtJustice; and
Spottswood Robinson, who later became Chief Judge of the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals.4' Judge Keith credits his judicial vision to his
student days at Howard.' There, in the company of Justice Marshall,
Dean Houston, and many others, Judge Keith came 1:o accept the
Constitution as a living document, which he believes offers insight, and
even prescription, for correcting societal wrongs even if Congress is too
weak or malevolent to act.4'
In discussing the genesis of his understanding of his role as a judge,
Judge Keith stated "I was taught the law should be an instrument of
social change,""0 and that "the Constitution was our best hope; that
equality would come through the law.... "If I would not have met
Thurgood Marshall, it would have drastically changed my life. He told
me that through the law and the Constitution, we could challenge the
theory of racism. He was the pivotal legal giant who changed my life."' 2
Although Judge Keith has triumphed over the hegemonic force of
race, racism greatly burdened his early legal career. As of September
1949, the 160th anniversary of our nation's founding, no African-
American had ever been appointed to the federal courts as an Article III
judge. "Before 1950, there were no black judges in Michigan, and few
black lawyers were hired in key government posts."' 3 In conveying his
treatment from the all White bench, Judge Keith stated:
Many of the white judges simply were not nice to us-they
didn't treat us as they did other lawyers, with dignity and
respect. Some were actually outright mean, if not nasty, and
belittling in their dealings with black attorneys... .We [black
lawyers] had to struggle to get case assignments from the bench.
In addition, clients saw or knew how poorly black lawyers were
47. See id. at 325-26.
48. See ia
49. See Trevor W. Coleman, Jude Keith Takes the Lav' Indght and et.rltLve Fair4
forAll, DET. FREE PRESS, June 2, 1998, at 8A.
50. WASHINGTON, supra note 44, at 113.
51. Littlejohn, supra note 40, at 327.
52. Mike Wowk, Urban LeagueHailrFour 'Ditinguished Wariors," DEr NEWS, Mar.
4, 1998, at 7S.
53. Littlejohn, supra note 40, at 327.
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treated in court. Many of the black citizens in Detroit came
from the South and they knew, first-hand, about racism in the
legal system and how it could determine the outcome of their
case.SJudges, as much as any aspect of the legal system, caused
many black clients to shun black lawyers."5
Despite these obstades, Judge Keith, in 1964, founded the highly
successful law firm of Keith, Conyers, Anderson, Brown & Wahls. s6 In
1967, when President Lyndon B.Johnson appointed Judge Keith to the
federal bench, he had already immersed himself in the struggle for
equality as a member of the Wayne County Board of Commissioners,
the Detroit Housing Commission, and the Michigan Civil Rights
Commission. 7 His commitment to equality earned him his nickname
"the Jackie Robinson of modern day judges."'
In describing the political climate for African-American federal
judges in the 1980s, Harvard law professor and former law clerk to
Judge Keith, Lani Guinier, noted that African American judges were an
endangered species on the federal appeals circuit during the Reagan-
54. In describing the atmosphere in which Black lawyers practiced in the South,
particularlyFlorida,Joseph Hatchett, former Florida Supreme CourtJustice and Chief
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, stated "[b]ack
then black lawyers practiced in segregated courthouses. There were separate drinking
fountains and separate bathrooms .... I remember goinginto the DeLand courthouse
for the first time and looking around for my client's family. It was the first time that
it dawned on me that black people-at that time, in that area-sat in a special
mezzanine over the main courthouse." Gary Blankenship, Diverji6y in the Florida Bar,
74 FLA. BJ. 64 (Apr. 2000).
55. See Littlejohn, supra note 40, at 329.
56. The original members were Nathan G. Conyers, President of Riverside Ford,
Inc.; Herman J. Anderson, Senior Partner with the firm of Anderson & Associates,
P.C.; Joseph N. Brown, Partner in the firm of Bodman, Longley & Dahling; and the
late Judge Myron H. Wahls,Judge of the Michigan Court ofAppeals.JudgeJoseph N.
Baltimore, Chief Judge, 36th District Court, Detroit, Michigan, and Administrative
Law Judge Theodore Stephens, thereafter became partners in the law firm. Detroit
Recorders' CourtJudge Prentis Edwards and Wayne County CircuitJudge Claudia H.
Morcom were associates in the firm for several years. Detroit Mayor Dennis W.
Archer interned with the firm while a student at Detroit College of Law. The firm of
Keith, Conyers, Anderson, Brown & Wahls produced more judges than any other law
finn in Michigan.
57. See Bonnie De Simone and OralandarBrand-Williams, Afican-AmencanA nhive
Gives Legal Giants a Place in Hirtogy, DEC. NEWS & FREE PRESS, at 14A.
58. Id
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Bush administrations, when that Court became "a symbol of White
power." 9 Guinier quoted an African writer who said that "a poet who
is not in trouble with the king is in trouble with his work."' Judge
Keith, she continued, may have been in trouble with the king during the
Reagan-Bush years, but he was not in trouble with his work."'
Even after several decades of success on the federal bench, Judge
Keith found no insulation from the effects of race. Although he had
achieved the pinnacle of successful contribution to equality, racism
continued to mar his own life. For example, the Honorable Frank X.
Altimari, United States Court of Appeals Judge for the Second Circuit,
relates this story, which occurred in 1991 whileJudge Keith was serving
as the National Chairman of theJudicial Conference Committee on the
Bicentennial of the Constitution:62
I will never forget the day when we were together at a
conference in Virginia. Judge Keith and I were standing outside
the entrance of our hotel when a car pulled up. The driver
jumped out of the car, apparently in a rush, and attempted to
give the keys to Damon with the command, "Boy! Park this car
in the parking lot." Damon quietly turned his back and walked
in the opposite direction. As, I, furious, rushed toward the
offending driver, Damon stopped me, again intoning the words,
"Whom the devil would destroy, he first makes angry.;
63
59. Eric Pope, WSU Cekbrates Creation of Keith Law Colktion, DE'. LEGAL NEWS,
Nov. 11, 1993.
60. Id
61. See id
62. The members of the judicial Conference of the United States Committee on
the Bicentennial of the Constitution, ofwhichJudge Keith was chair, included: the late
Justice Harry A. Blackmun; ChiefJustice Warren E. Burger, Judge Arthur L. Alarcon;
Judge Frank X. Altimari; Judge Adrian G. Duplantier, Judge William Brevard Hand;
Justice Edward F. Hennessey;Judge Patrick F. KellyJudgeJames H. Meredith; Judge
Robert C. Murphy;Judge Helen W. Nies;JudgeJames E. Noland;JudgeJaime Pieras,
Jr.; Judge Dolores Korman Sloviter, Judge Kenneth W. Starr; and Judge J. Harvie
Wilkinson, III. The Committee was responsible for the placement of 300 Bill ofRights
Plaques in federal courthouses around the country.
63. Letter from Frank X. Altimari, United States Circuit Judge for the Second
Circuit, 42 WAYNE L. REV. iv (1996). Rodney A. Smolla also recounts this incident,
stating 'Ijudge Keith turned this incident into a powerful homily later that afternoon
at one of the conference's public presentations. 'A day does not go by" he thundered,
'in which I am not reminded that I am an African American, and that this nation is still
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The systemic denial of his own civil rights has made Judge Keith
keenly aware of the rights of others. He has used his positioning in the
margins to develop an acute sensitivity to fairness and commitment to
equality. His own experiences with material subjugation as a
governmental policy have created in him an unyielding commitment to
a more equitable distribution of power. "With enthusiasm and warmth
that is irresistible, he works in countless ways, formal and informal, in
tireless pursuit of a society that is more tolerant and just""
IV. RESISTANCE: JUDGE KEITH'S LEGAL IDEOLOGY AND THE
EXPANSIVE VIEW OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW
"The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do
not turn aside in their course and pass the judges by."6
The war between those committed to a more equitable distribution
of power and those who feel victimized by the remedial gains of the
Civil Rights Movement has produced two ideological trends in anti-
discrimination law. Professor Kimberly Crenshaw has coined these two
confficting ideologies, the expansive view and the restrictive view.66
Adherents to the restrictive vision (1) see equality as a process,
downplaying actual outcomes; (2) seek to prevent future wrongdoing,
rather than redress present manifestations of past injustice; (3) accept
oppression as isolated actions against individuals, not a societal policy
against an entire group;67 (4) reject the idea that courts should redress
plagued by prejudice."' Letter from Rodney A. Smolla, Professor of Law and Director,
Institute of Bill of Rights Law, 42 WAYNE L. REV. viii (1996).
64. Id
65. BENJAMINN. CARDozO,THENATUREOFTHEJUDICIALPROCESS 168 (1921).
66. See Race, Reform, and Retrenchment, sutpra note 2, at 1341.
67. In explaining the individualized notion ofdiscrimination and its allure, Stanley
Fish draws an interesting analogy between the Rodney King defense and the majority
opinion inAdarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). See Stanley Fish, How the Right HM'acked
the Mgic Words, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,1995. In answering how the Rodney King jurors
could have acquitted the police, Fish states that part of the answer lies within the two
part defense strategy: (1) the film depicting the beating was slowed down "so that each
frame was isolated and stood by itself'; (2) "the defense asked the questions that
treated each frozen frame as if everything in the case hung on it and it alone. Is this
blow an instance of excessive force? Is this blow intended to kill or maim?" Id.
In describing the effectiveness of this strategy Fish states:
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harms from America's racist and sexist past,s as opposed to policing
society to eliminate a narrow set of proscribed discriminatory practices;
and (5) adopt an ahistorical approach to adjudic.ting, which
deemphasizes America's discriminatory past. 9 Moreover, adherents to
Under the pressure of such questions, the event as a whole disappeared from
view and was replaced by a series of discontinuous moments. Looking only
at individual moments cut off from the context that gave them meaning, the
jury could not say of any of them that this did grievous harm -to Rodney
King. This strategy--of first segmenting reality and then placing all the
weight on individual bits of it-is useful whenever you want to deflect
attention away from the big picture, and that is why it has proved so
attractive to those conservative Republicans who want to roll back the
regulatory state. On every front, from environmental protection to
affirmative action, large questions of ecology and justice are pushed into the
background by the same segmenting techniques that made it easy for the
jurors in Simi Valley to forget it was a beating they were seeing.
I
Linking the individualized connection to Adarand, Fish states:
In Adarand v. Pena, the question was whether the policy of giving financial
incentives to prime contractors who hire minority subcontractors is
constitutional. Those in favor of the incentives justify them by invoking
constitutional history and the history of discrimination in the contracting
industry. They remind us, in Justice John Paul Stevens words, that the
"primary purpose of the Equal Protection Clause to end discrimination of
the former slaves," and they report that even today certain groups remain
entrenched in the building trades while others are virtually shut out.
Id
Those opposed to the incentives reject arguments from history and specifically
reject the argument that historical patterns of discrimination have impaired the life
chances of African-Americans as a group. They say it is individuals, not groups, that
are protected by the Constitution, and they would allow remedies for discrimination
only in cases where there has been "an individualized showing" of harm, a harm
inflicted discreetly on a specific person by a specific agent at a specific time. See id
68. Crenshaw notes that the "Supreme Court stated this viewpoint with stark
clarity in United irlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977): 'A discriminatory act...
which occurred before the [Civil Rights Act of 1964] was passed .... may constitute
relevant background evidence [regarding past conduct] ... but separately considered
. . . is merely an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal
consequences."' Race, Retrenchment, andReform, supra note 2, at 1342. This viewwas also
endorsed by.Judge Merritt in Young v. KutzVick, 652 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1981),
"Obviously there are many unjust conditions and occurrences, natural and man-made,
which federal courts do not have the strength, wisdom or power to remedy in a timely
manner." Id at 625 n.8.
69. See Race, Refom, and Retrenchment, sura note 2, at 1342.
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the restrictive view argue that even where injustice exists, remediation
must be balanced against, and limited by, the interests of Whites-even
when Black subordination created those interests. Accordingly, the
alleged innocence of Whites and the benefits that they have derived
from racism, are more important than the harm racism inflicts on Black
people70 In sum, the restrictive view seeks to proscribe only certain
kinds of subordinating acts, and even then only if White interests are
not overly burdened.
By contrast, adherents to the expansive view (1) accept equality as
a result, (2) strive to prevent future wrongdoing and redress present
manifestations of past injustice, (3) understand discrimination as a
societal policy against an entire group, (4) use the institutional power of
the courts to ameliorate the effects of oppression, (5) attempt to
eradicate the substantive conditions of subordination, (6) avoid drawing
a false symmetry of racial victimization between Whites adversely
affected by remedial programs and Blacks historically subjected to
discrimination, and (7) adopt a historical approach to adjudication,
which fully outlines both current and past American hegemony.
Adherence to the expansionist or restrictive view of anti-
discrimination law results from the world view of the interpreter, as
opposed to an apolitical, self-evident interpretation or neutral
principle.71 CriticalLegal Studies (CLS) scholars have argued that judges
70. Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged the effects ofpast and present
societal discrimination, see Metro Broadcastin, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 613 (1990)
(O'Connor, J. dissenting) (stating "[]n Croson, we held that an interest in remedying
societal discrimination cannot be considered compelling7), the personal rights of
Whites burdened by a particular remedial plan are more important than the state
interest in eliminating the effects of racism. See Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-
Consdousness, 91 CoLUM. L. REV. 1060 (1991). Justice Powell summarized this view in
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Edcation, 476 U.S. 267 (1986):
No one doubts that there has been serious racial discrimination in this
country. But as the basis of imposing discriminatory klgalremedies that work
against innocent people, societal discrimination is insufficient and over-
expansive. In the absence of particularized findings, a court could uphold
remedies that are ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their
ability to affect the future.
Id. at 276.
71. See Race, Reform, and Retrenchment, sVra note 2, at 1342. Professor Sylvia R.
LazosVargas suggests that the difference in understanding racism between Whites and
Blacks emanates from the experience of the viewer, such that Whites view
discrimination as "conscious, casuistic, individualist, and culpable," whereas Blacks
11812001]
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
are "socially constructed"; 2 thus, culture, social bacbground, and
context direct their decision making. 3 Although judges interpret the law
in good faith, they do so according to their social experiences, which are
positioned according to gender, race, class, and culture.7 4 As a necessary
corollary, no legal rule is truly "neutral" because it incorporates political,
ideological, economic, and philosophical assumptions. Moreover, legal
rules reflect political or cultural sensibilities and judges incorporate these
sensibilities when applying legal rules to individual cases.
For example, in both the expansionist and the restrictive approach,
all arguments about what the law is are premised upon what the law
should be, given a particular world view. The conflict is not between the
true meaning of the law and a bastardized version, but between two
different interpretations of society. Thus, although adherents to the
restrictive vision claim an apolitical advantage and accuse civil rights
visionaries of bastardizing the law through politics, neoconservatives
themselves rely on their own political interpretations to give meaning
to their concepts of rights and oppression. The critical point is that law
itself does not dictate which vision will be adopted as an interpretive
base, but rather, the viewer's life experiences.
5
As another example, advocates of color-blind policies, a by-product
of the restrictive view, implicitly assume that racial equality already
exists. These advocates posit that inconveniencing Whites with remedial
programs is "just as bad" as the history of discrimination against people
of color. Thus, the "proper" role for judges is to assmure equality of
process. Once equality of process is obtained, real differences between
groups would explain a difference in outcome, not past c:scrimination.
Furthermore, when the free market is liberated from burdensome
interpret "discrimination as a broad systemic practice, a social text concordant with
how racial minorities experience discrimination, as unconscious, diffuse, systemic, and
negligent." See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Democra and Inchusiow. Reconceptuaklng the Rok
of the Judge in a Pluralist Po' y, 58 MD. L. REV. 150, 169 (1999).
72. Vargas, supranote 71, at 197 (citingJEROMEFRANK, LAWAND THEMODERN
MIND 100-18,137-38 (1935)) ("arguing that judges come to cases with biases, and that
the process of judging is a manifestation of the judge's individual personality and
values, concealed by the language of'compelling mechanical logic"'.
73. See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, supra note 17, at 141 (citing Richard :Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can JugesrAvoid Setious Moral Errr?, 69 TEx. L. REV.
1929, 1956-57 (1991)).
74. See Vargas, supra note 71, at 198.
75. See Race, Reform, and Retrenchment, supra note 2, at 1345-46.
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government regulation, such as affirmative action, and irrational
prejudices, employers' decisions to hire the best workers at the least cost
would explain any stratification between groups.
7 6
By contrast, adherents to the expansionist vision recognize the
importance of historical contextuality and understand that historical fact
negates color-blindness as a viable option. According to expansionists,
color-blindness and equal process would be obsolete if, in fact, people
of color had been treated differently historically and if the effects of this
disparate treatment had not created the current material subordination.'
Furthermore, expansionists understand that racial domination, not
cultural inferiority, explains differences in economic status. In fact,
expansionists recognize that historical discrimination itself creates
cultural disadvantage.
Because equal opportunity rhetoric ambiguously incorporates both
the expansionist view and the restrictive view,7' such that University X
can claim to be an equal opportunity educator, and yet maintain a
disproportionately White student body, the civil rights community runs
the risk of allowing an ambiguous, ahistorical antidiscrimination
discourse to pollute its political consciousness. To give equal
opportunity meaning, the civil rights community must maintain a
contextualized world view that reflects Black reality.79 Despite the need
for creativity, ingenuity, and the acceptance of multiple methods for
engaging the struggle, an effective political consciousness for the civil
rights community necessitates an ideology grounded in the material and
historicalreality of Black people.' The expansionistview represents this
ideology.
Judge Keith has consistently and willingly embraced the challenge
76. See ide at 1344-45.
77. As Alfred Blumrosen observes, "it [is] clear that a 'color-blind' society built
upon the subordination of persons of one color [is] a society which [cannot] correct
that subordination because it [can] never recognize it." Race, Reform, and Retrenchment,
supra note 2, at n.60 (citing A. Blumrosen, Twenq Years ofTitk Vff Law An Oveniew 26
(Apr. 18,1995)) (unpublished manuscript on file in the Harvard Law Library); see aso
Stanley Fish, When Pnihndpks Get In the Way, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1996, at.A27 (arguing
that under an ahistorical approach, when a politically divisive issue like affirmative
action is stripped of its historical conditions, "there no longer seems to be any moral
difference between the two [conflicting] sides" of the argument).
78. See Race, Reform, and Retrenchment, jura note 2, at 1342.
79. See id at 1353.
80. See id. at 1387.
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of the expansionist vision. Through his opinions, Judge Keith has
demonstrated an effective ideology grounded in the material and
historical reality of the oppressed. In articulating his vision of the law as
an instrument of equality, Judge Keith stated:
We must continue to pave the way for progressive discourse
in the way of race and economic relations in this country. In the
face of great adversity, our heads may be bloodied but remain
unbowed. We must live the vision of equality in its many facets.
America's problem can no longer be regarded as a problem
solely of civil rights. It has now become an issue of human
rights with social and economic justice.
The principle difference lies in the fact that civil rights
sought changes in the law and the gaining of equal protection
of those laws. Social and economic justice seek to bring about
a total restructuring of our society and our institutions. We must
seek to achieve not simply the integration of the races, but the
liberation, equality, and economic independence of alli peoples.
Do not mistake this assertion as a call for social engineering.
For justice has as its goal achieving equity and parity in the
access to all of the opportunities, all of the benefits, all of the
rewards and all of the powers of the total American society."1
V. JUDGE KEITH'S EXPANSIONIST VISION AND RACE
Baker v. City of Detroit,' Stamps v. Detroit Edison,3 Davis v. School
District of the City of Ponuiac, Gamtt v. City ofHamtramk,s United States v.
Harvy,86 and United States v. Taylor,7 exemplify Judge Keith's successful
use of a historical approach emblematic of the expansionist vision. In
these cases,Judge Keith has given the facts meaning by fuly elaborating
them within their greater historical context By contextualizing the facts,
Judge Keith has debunked the notion of racism as the product of
81. Keith, supra note 44, at 1.
82. 483 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
83.365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
84. 309 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
85. 394 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
86. 16 F.3d 109 (6th Cir. 1994).
87. 956 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1992).
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individual bad actors and exposed it for the societal policy that it is and
has always been. Baker, Stamps, Davis, Garrett, Harvey, and Tayor reflect
the material reality of Black people in areas of employment, education,
and housing. As a matter of legal history, Judge Keith has documented
that Black people do not create their own material inequality; but rather,
the hegemonic force of racism unequally distributes power leaving
Blacks subordinated.
In addition, both Taylorand Hanvyinvolve racial profiling, a practice
by which law enforcement subjects blacks and other people of color to
discriminatory searches because they are not white.
Judge Keith's use of the historical approach provides a sharp
contrast to the ahistorical approach and highlights its shortcomings. The
ahistorical approach creates a false equality between Whites and Blacks
and draws a false symmetry of despair between Whites burdened by
remedial measures and Blacks historically subjugated. This false
symmetry enables courts to privilege harm imposed on Whites from
remedial action over the harms imposed on Blacks by a history of
discrimination.' In Baker, Stamps, Davis, and Garrett, Judge Keith has
demonstrated that allegedly "innocent Whites" have made gains, not
only from individual merit, but also from institutional policies that
deliberately exclude Blacks and include Whites. Having established the
historical institutionalization of racist hegemony in the facts of the
cases, Judge Keith summoned the full power of the court to ameliorate
88. In City of Ricb,,ond v. J.A Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 502 (1989), the Supreme
Court invalidated a Richmond set-aside program for minority businesses. The Court
held that color-blind principles would be used to evaluate state action. See id Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion in Croson announced a prohibition on racial
classifications:
The Richmond Plan denies certain citizens the opportunity to compete for
a fixed percentage of public contracts based solely upon their race. To
whatever racial group these citizens belong, their "personal rights" to be
treated with equal dignity and respect are infringed by a rigid rule erecting
race as the sole criterion in an aspect of public decision making.
Id at 493. Justice Thomas has also echoed this sentiment stating "it is irrelevant
whether... racial classifications are drawn by those who wish to oppress a race or by
those who have a sincere desire to help those thought to be disadvantaged." Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment). In order for racial classifications in remedial programs
to be "just as bad" as the history of discrimination against Blacks, one must assume,
among other things, an equality of despair. See id
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the substantive and material conditions of inequality that are present in
these cases.
A. Affirmative Action: Baker v. City of Detroit
In Baker, the defendant Detroit Police Department (police
department or defendant) 9 adopted an affirmative action plan (the plan)
in which equal numbers of Black and White police sergeants were
promoted to the rank of lieutenant" In response, plaintiffs, White
candidates who the police department would have promoted if it had
followed customary rank order, claimed that the defendant "passed over
them" solely because they were white,9 in violation of Tit] e VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.2
Judge Keith justified the affirmative action program and withstood
reversal on appeal by (1) utilizing a historical approach; (2) fully
developing the factual record; (3) giving meaning to the facts before the
court by placing them within their relevant historical context; (4)
documenting the police department's long-standing racist policies of
excluding Black police officers and violence toward Black citizens; and
(5) avoiding a false symmetry of despair between Whites harmed by the
plan and Blacks against whom the defendant had institutionally and
violently discriminated.
Baker is phenomenal in both the breadth of the facts and the
historical context included in the court's opinion. Having ruled that
plaintiffs were not entitled to a jury,'93 the following facts were before
Judge Keith and he included them in his opinion.
89. In Baker, the defendants further included the City of Detroit; Coleman A.
Young, then Mayor of the City of Detroit, the Detroit Board of Police Commissioners
and its individual members; and Philip G. Tannian, Chief of Police. Baker v. CG* of
Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 930, 937 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
90. See id at 936.
91. Id at 964.
92. Plaintiffs specifically alleged violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended March 24,1972,42 U.S.C. § 2000d; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, as amended March 24, 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-17; 706(f)(1) and (3), 42
U.S.C. % 1981, 1983, and 1985(3); and both the United States and Michigan
Constitution. See Baker, 483 F. Supp. at 937.
93. See Baker, 483 F. Supp. at 930.
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1. Faas
In 1943, at the time of the first Detroit race riots, the police
department had only forty-three Black officers out of more than three
thousand. Walter White and Thurgood Marshall, who at the time
worked for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) and later became a justice on the Supreme Court,
prepared an analysis of the riot. Justice Marshall described the police
department's role in the riot as follows:
In the June riots of this year, the Detroit police ran true to form.
The trouble reached riot proportions because the police of
Detroit once again enforced the law under an unequal hand.
They used "persuasion" rather than firm action with [W]hite
rioters while against [N]egroes they used the ultimate force;
night sticks, revolvers, riot guns, submachine guns, and deer
guns. As a result, 25 of the 34 persons killed were Negroes. Of
the 25 Negroes killed, 17 were killed by police.94
Of the White people who were killed, none were killed by police
officers.95
In the same report, Mr. White complained of the "inadequate
number" of Black officers and specifically recommended "that the
number of Negro officers be increased from 43 to 350 [and] that there
be immediate promotions of Negro officers in uniform to positions of
responsibility." '96
The City of Detroit (the "City"), however, refused to follow this
recommendation.97 According to the 1950 census, non-white people
comprised 84% of Detroit's population. However, between 1944 and
1953, annual Black hires ranged from four to twenty-eight whereas
annual White hires ranged from 135 to 560.98 White officers were
occasionally assigned to ride with Black officers as a form of
94. Id at 940-41 (citing Thurgood Marshall, Aditiftes of Pole Duing the RiotsJune
21 and 22, 1943, in WHITE & MARSHALL, WHAT CAUSED THE DETROIT RIOT? AN
ANALYSIS 29-30 (NAACP 1943)).
95. See id
96. Id at 941 (citing WHITE & MARSHALL, sr*ra note 94, at 17).
97. See id
98. See id
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punishment 99 Furthermore, "there were only a handful of Black
Sergeants and Lieutenants. However, they were not deemed good
enough to supervise Whites."'' 0
The "New Bethel Church Incident" of 1969 provides another
illustration of the relationship the police shared with Black residents:
Following reports that a [W]hite policeman had been shot near
the New Bethel Church, twenty or thirty policemen converged
on the building. The people inside the church were [B]lack and
included women and children. The police went on an
unprovoked rampage and began shooting and looting. The
people in the church ducked for cover as best they could. The
shooting was stopped by two [B]lack officers who physically
removed the guns from the hands of the White officers.'"'
In 1967, the police department was no more than 6% Black
although the City of Detroit was almost 40% Black. 2 At the same time,
Blacks represented a paltry 2.1% of the police department's supervisors.
Nine of 348 Sergeants and two of 158 Lieutenants were Black. 3 In
June 1974, the department was 17.2% Black, but only 5.15% of the
sergeants and 4.78% of the lieutenants were Black.
2. Holding
Judge Keith upheld the plan, and stated "no reasonable person
could fail to conclude that given the history of antagonism between the
police department and the Black community, the affirmative action plan
was a necessary response to what had been an ongoing city crisis." '
Furthermore, by fully contextualizing the facts within their greater
historical dimensions, Judge Keith established the following premises
in his written opinion: (1) racism is a societal policy perpetrated by some
99. See id
100. Id at 942.
101. Id at 996-97.
102. See id at 946.
103. See id at 952.
104. See id
105. Id. at 1000.
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Whites against Blacks; ' (2) racism has directly caused the
subordination of Blacks; °7 (3) some Whites, as individuals and Whites
generally, have benefitted from Black subordination;.-" (4) the historical
willingness of Whites to engage in racist conduct and to benefit directly
from such conduct undermines their claim to alleged "innocence"; °1
and (5) the need to redress this historical wrongdoing outweighs
competing White interests. 0
a. Radsm as Sodetal Po[y
The facts ofBakerexemplify the coercive power of race, specifically
the police department's institutional commitment to not only exclude
Blacks, but to direct violence at them."' The police department had
implemented several employment policies deliberately designed to
exclude Blacks."' As Judge Keith noted, "the evidence in the record of
blatantly discriminatory treatment of Black citizens winked at by the
department as well as blatant discrimination against Black officers in the
department provides additional compelling evidence that the
department was deliberately keeping Blacks out. 113 Having thus
established the record, it was impossible for the plaintiffs to argue that
only a few White officers had discriminated against a few individual
Blacks in a few isolated circumstances.
b. Inequalt' as Direct Pmduct of Racism
The police department's exclusionary and discriminatory conduct
directly caused the the paltry numbers of Blacks within the police
department Judge Keith demonstrated that if the police department
had hired Blacks in proportion to their representation in the relevant
labor market, 1,366 more Blacks would have been hired."4 As a
106. See id. at 1000-03.
107. See id
108. See id
109. See iR
110. See i
111. See id at 940-79.
112. See id
113. Id at 992.
114. See id at 960.
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necessary corollary, 1,366 Whites had jobs that they would not have had
"but for" the deliberate exclusion of Blacks.
c. Rejection of White 'lnnocence"
In claiming that they were "innocent," plaintiffs attempted to
deflect the reality that Whites had benefitted from Black oppression in
an abundance of conspicuous and less conspicuous ways. By failing to
examine critically the opportunities that racism created for Whites,
namely 1,366 jobs, the plaintiffs failed to comprehend that the denial of
opportunity for minorities led to increased opportunities for Whites.
The exclusion of minorities, contemporarily and historically, from
access to opportunities necessarily implies the over-inclusion of Whites.
Until this basic truism is addressed, racial hierarchy will persist' 1 Thus,
in presenting themselves as "innocent," plaintiffs obscured the
following questions: (1) What White person is "innocent," if innocence
is defined as the absence of advantage at the expense of others?; and (2)
Since discrimination against people of color has been historical,
pervasive, and legally enshrined, what Black person is not an "actual"
victim?1 6
Moreover, in constructing the defense of White "innocence,"
plaintiffs demonstrated two hegemonic reactions to remedial measures:
Remediation hurts innocent White people, and it advantages
undeserving Black people.' In other words, the plan did not merely do
115. See John A. Powell, The 'Radng" ofAmrican Sode_*: Race Functioning as a Verb
Before Signfingg as a Noun, 15 LAW & INEQ. 99,125 (1997).
116. Thomas Ross, Innocence andAffirmativeA'on, 43 VAND. L. Rv. 297,300-01
(1990).
117. Justice Powell applied the rhetoric of White innocence in rejecting the
affirmative action plan in Univnity of Ca/#frnia v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Powell
complained of the patent unfairness of "innocent persons . . .asked to endure
[deprivation as] the price of membership in the dominant majority." Id at 294 n.34.
He wrote of "forcing innocent persons . . . to bear the burdens of redressing
grievances not of their making." Ia at 298.
By contrast, Justice Marshall's and Justice Brennan's dissenting opinions each
challenged the premise of White innocence. Seeia. at 324,387.Justice B.rennan rejected
the requirement of proof of individual and specific discrimination as a prerequisite to
affirmative action. He wrote "[s]uch relief does not require as a predicate proof that
recipients of preferential advancement have been individually discriminated against;
it is enough that each recipient is within a general class of persons likely to have been
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bad things to good ("innocent') people nor merely do good things for
bad ("undeserving") people; the plan did both at once and in harmony.
Given the hegemonic appeal of this construction, its persistence in
politics and legal opinions is not surprising.
When judges establish a symmetry of racial victimization between
Whites adversely affected by remedial programs and Blacks historically
subjected to discrimination, they must deny the difference race has
made in the historical treatment of the two groups and the disparity in
power between the two groups."' When courts decide to subject race
conscious remedial action to the same level of scrutiny as White racist
conduct, they are equalizing power between Blacks and Whites. This
equalization of power only exists in a hypothetical world that ignores
the structural reality race has created. This fallacious equality of despair
demonstrates the ability of decontextualization and an ahistoxical
approach to erase reality, create fiction, and repeal attempts to
ameliorate Black subordination." 9
By contrast, Judge Keith's historical approach negated the White
officers' ability to claim innocence. Although plaintiffs claimed that they
were "wholly innocent!' and that the City, as opposed to them as
individuals, was guilty of the original discrimination, Judge Keith
the victims of discrimination." Id- at 363. (Brennan, J. dissenting). Justice Marshall
attacked the rhetoric of White innocence and the questioning of Black victimization
directly. "It is unnecessary in the 20th century America to have individual Negroes
demonstrate that they have been victims of racial discrimination; the racism of our
society has been so pervasive that none, regardless ofwealth or position, has managed
to escape its impact." Id at 400 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
118. In articulating the dangers of the ahistorical approach, which permits drawing
a false symmetry, Stanley Fish states "Pit is just like saying (what no one would say)
that killing in self-defense is morally the same as killing for money because in either
case it is killing you're doing. When the law distinguishes between these scenarios, it
recognizes that the judgment one passes on an action will vary with the motives
informing it. It was the express purpose of some powerful, White Americans to
disenfranchise, enslave, and later exploit Black Americans. It was what they set out to
do, whereas the proponents of affirmative action did not set out to deprive your
friend's cousin's son of a place at Harvard." Fish, Apra note 77, at 733.
119. In Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), Justice O'Connor uses the false
symmetry between the victimization of Whites through remedial redistricting efforts
and the institutionally sanctioned disenfranchisement ofBlacks. Shewrote "appellants'
claim that the state engaged in unconstitutional racial gerrymandering .... strikes a
powerful historical chord: It is unsettling how closely the North Carolina plan
resembles the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past." i at 525.
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squarely confronted the White officers and their innocence stating.
It was the [W]hite officers who were guilty of mistreating
[B]lack citizens. It was [W]hite officers who went on a ticket
strike in 1959 when the City proposed integrating squad cars. It
was [Wihite officers who fiercely resisted efforts to integrate the
department throughout the 1960s....
The City did not ask what the plaintiffs and the Lieutenants
and Sergeants Association were doing during the many years
that [White officers abused [B]lack officers in the department
and [B]lack citizens on the street This Court will not ask
either ....
Instead, the Court will uphold the City's affirmative action
plan as proper under federal and state law.120
d. Histotical Wrongdoing Outweighs White Innocence
The facts of Bakerbrought the conflicting interests of Whites in the
benefits made possible by a discriminatory past and the interests of
Blacks in justice into sharp relief. Judge Keith squarely confronted this
conflict and held that "[t]he City did not act to favor [B]lacks out of
malice toward [W]hites, or even capriciousness[; but rather,] [i]t acted
to favor [B]lacks because as a class, they had been subject to debilitating
discrimination for years on end."12' Furthermore, according to Judge
Keith "[a]ll affirmative action programs have an adverse effect on
Whites and to one extent or another upset their settled expectations.
Where past discrimination against Blacks has been shown, courts have
reasoned that making up for past discrimination justifies upsetting the
120. Baker, 483 F. Supp. at 1002-03. Judge Keith has similarly denounced the
construction of "White innocence" in other cases. See, e.g., Aiken v. CG.y ofMemphis, 37
F.3d 1155, 1181 (6th Cir. 1994). In the dissenting opinion, Judge Keith stated "In
1994, equality is far from won. In fact, today we are faced with a new oxymoron-the
notion of reverse racial discrimination. This outrageous notion is nothing but
inflammatory fodder designed to discourage taking race into account even where such
accounting promotes fundamental fairness, equality and justice."
121. Baker, 483 F. Supp. at 980.
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expectations of White workers."'" In other words, "[a]ll affirmative
action programs have some adverse effect on Whites who must step
aside so that Blacks may be hired or promoted."'"
B. Employment Dcimination: Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co.
In holding that defendant Detroit Edison (Edison), a utility, had
discriminated against minority employees, in violation of the Civil
Rights Act,24 Judge Keith fully historicized Edison's discriminatory
practices in both hiring and assigning its minority employees."2 The
following facts were before Judge Keith and were included in his
opinion.
1. Facts
UntilJuly 2,1965, Edison only used White hiring interviewers.'26 In
1966, when Detroit was approximately 40% Black, 27 Edison employed
304 Blacks out of 9,475 employees and only four of Edison's 1,722
officials and managers were Black." s In 1972, Edison employed
approximately 860 Blacks out of approximately 11,500 employees
although Detroit was approximately 44% Black. 29
In addition to hiring few Blacks, Edison had a reputation of limiting
its Black employees to menial jobs such as janitor, porter, shoe shine
boy, elevator operator, wall washer, lamp changer, coal ash handler, and
utility serviceman.3 ° Rather than promote its Black employees, Edison
would sometimes hire skilled tradesmen from Canada who, in some
cases, did not speak English." Additionally, Edison deliberately
recruited Blacks with poor employment records, when Blacks on its
122. Id at 985 (citing Franks v. Bowman Trans. Co., 424 U.S. 747,772-78 (1976);
EEOC v. AT&T Co., 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977)).
123. Id at 919.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000f (1994).
125. See Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
126. See id at 102-03.
127. See Baker, 483 F. Supp. at 946.
128. See Stamps, 365 F. Supp. at 93.
129. See id
130. See id at 102.
131. See id at 108.
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own payroll had good employment records, and yet Edison refused to
promote or transfer them. 32 Moreover, Edison used a non-job-related
examination to "freeze the status quo of past discrimination."''
In dealings with its unions, only Whites represented Edison, and
with the exception of the named plaintiff, only Whites represented the
unions."M One of Edison's unions, Local 223, refused to process Blacks'
grievances, negotiated discriminatory seniority provisions, failed to
accord Black meter readers the rights that Whites had, gerrymandered
seniority districts, and excluded Blacks from political office, by among
other things, requesting reelections where Blacks had been elected.131
2. Holding
Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Edison continued
to claim recalcitrantly that it "ha[d] and d[id] recruit, hire, transfer, and
promote qualified persons according to their availability and their ability
without regard to race or color.' 36 In response to Edison's defense and
based on a fully developed factual record, Judge Keith replied that, in
regard to hiring and promoting Blacks, Edison "ha[d] done nothing at
all which has produced fruitful results." 37 Furthermore, "because of
discrimination, Black employees and rejected applicants ha[d] lost
employment opportunities which would have allowed them to earn
more than they ha[d] earned.' 38 Therefore, Judge Keith held that it was
"appropriate to award them amounts of back pay sufficient to restore
them to the economic position in which they would have been but for
this discrimination.' 139 Accordingly, Judge Keith ordered Edison to pay
four million dollars and Local 223 to pay two hundred fity thousand
dollars.' 4'
In addition to providing new job opportunities for Black workers,
at the time Judge Keith's ruling represented the largest damage award
132. See id
133. Id at 115.
134. See id at 112.
135. See id at 115.
136. Id at 94.
137. Id at 109.
138. Id at 119.
139. Id
140. See id at 124.
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in employment discrimination history against a single company. In
remarking on the impact ofJudge Keith's ruling, Carl T. Rowan wrote
in Just Between Us Black..4
Judge Keith lowered the judicial boom on Detroit Edison
in the belief that only this unprecedented kind of decree could
jar American industry out of the grip of entrenched,
institutionalized racism... mThe message is clear that half-
hearted attempts at corporate fairness in hiring and promotion
will no longer satisfy the courts .... With a stroke of his pen on
a monumental decree he has done more for Black equality than
a thousand loud speeches cursing Whitey.14
C. Education Discrimination: Davis v. School District of Pontia?43
In Davis, Judge Keith demonstrated his ability and willingness to
pierce the veil of empty equal opportunity rhetoric and unmask a
practice of deliberate discrimination even in the face of death threats. 44
1. Facts
In Davis, a case decided seventeen years after Brown v. Board of
Education,14s Black children, through their parents and guardians,
brought a class action against defendant School District of the City of
Pontiac, its Superintendent and Assistant Superintendents, and the
seven members of the Pontiac Board of Education (collectively
Pontiac)." Plaintiffs claimed that Pontiac denied them an education
under the same terms as White children and discriminated in their hiring
and assigning of teachers. 47
In its defense, Pontiac presented several board resolutions and
policies that had incorporated the empty rhetoric of equal opportunity.
141. CARL T. RowAN, JusT BEn.VEEN Us BLACKS 53 (1974).
142. Ia at 53.
143. 309 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
144. See Allan Lengel, Judge Keith Will Cut Back to Part-Time, DET. NEWS, Nov. 8,
1994.
145. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
146. See Davis, 309 F. Supp. at 735.
147. See iL
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For example, in 1954, Pontiac resolved to build new schools without
regard to race, color, or creed.' 4 However, Pontiac had, on at least two
occasions, built new Black schools to accommodate overcrowding in
predominately Black schools rather than accommodate the overflow of
Black students in nearby predominately White schools that had "an
overwhelmingly large capacity.
149
As another example of Pontiac's equal opportunity rhetoric masking
deliberate segregation, in 1955, Pontiac resolved to employ and assign
teachers and administrators "without regard to race, color, marital
status, nationality, or religion."' Despite these written commitments
to integrate faculties and administrations, Pontiac deliberately created
the following conditions:
Alcott School ha[d] a total enrollment of 608 students, 605 of
which are white; Alcott ha[d] no [B]lack teachers. Emerson
School ha[d] an enrollment of 656 students all of whom are
[W]hite; Emerson ha[d] one [Bjlack teacher. Weaver School,
Whitfield School, Wisner School, Malcolm School -nd Willis
School all ha[d] a [W]hite student body; each ha[d] one [B]lack
teacher. Other all-[W]hite schools ha[d], at most, two [B]lack
teachers. Whitter School, an all [B]lack school, ha[d] two
[Wihite teachers.'
2. Holding
In announcing his decision in Datis, Judge Keith started his analysis
by identifying the impact of discrimination on the actual material
realities of Black children stating "The Court begins its decision in this
matter confronted with the undisputed fact that Negro children are
being deprived of quality education in the Pontiac School System and
that early deprivation of innocent youtig children culminates in
permanent, devastating, irreparable harm - harm incapable of
subsequent correction." ' 2
148. See id at 737.
149. Id at 741.
150. Id at 737.
151. Id at 743.
152. Id at 736.
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Next, Judge Keith pierced Pontiac's smoke-screen defense.
Although Pontiac "had established a very long record of making policy
statements to the effect that they were committed to integrating the
Pontiac School System, [it] did nothing to implement that policy."'53
Moreover, according to Judge Keith "[p]ronouncements of good
intentions with nothing more amounts to 'monumental hypocrisy."'
15 4
Pontiac claimed that a school district had "no affirmative obligation
to achieve a balance of the races in the schools when the existing
imbalance [was] not attributable to school policies or practices and [was]
the result of housing patterns and other forces over which the school
administration had no control."'5 According to Pontiac, segregated
housing patterns, and notPontiac's discriminatory policies and conduct,
caused the racial imbalance in its schools. Despite Pontiac's claim of
innocence, Judge Keith focused his attention on Pontiac's policy of
shifting boundary lines and locating new schools in order to minimize
the prospect of achieving racial integration."5 6 Having identified this
practice, Judge Keith held that Pontiac "intentionally us[ed] the power
at [its] disposal to perpetuate a pattern of segregation that had the effect
of irreparably harming innocent young Negro children by depriving
them of a quality education."' 7 In further emphasizing Pontiac's
"wrongdoing," Judge Keith stated:
[O]fficials of the Pontiac School System admitted that the black
children in their system were being given an inferior education
which was psychologically damaging to their self-image and
economically damaging to their ability to perform in an adult
world; and that in 1967, after approximately twenty years of
doing nothing more than issuing resolutions and policy
statements regarding its intent to strive for and achieve racial
balance.... ma[de] one more statement of policy without any
act of implementation.15
8
153. Davis v. School Dist of Pontiac, 374 F. Supp. 141,145 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
154. Davis, 309 F. Supp. at 740 (citing Sen. Ribicoff, Feb. 9, 1970).
155. Davis v. School Dist. of Pontiac, 443 F.2d 573, 575 (6th Cir. 1971) (citing
Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1996)).
156. See Davis, 309 F. Supp. at 741-42.
157. Davir, 374 F. Supp. at 144.
158. Ia at 145 (citations omitted). On appeal, the Sixth Circuit upheld Judge
Keith's holding and further suggested that the United States Supreme Court followed
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In addition to piercing empty promises of equal oppo:rtunityJudge
Keith fashioned a legal remedy commensurate with the harm done. For
the first time in a United States school district above the Mason-Dixon
line,Judge Keith ruled that Pontiac was to be integrated by cross-district
busing at the beginning of the next school year."59 Moreover, his order
applied with equal force to Pontiac's teachers and admin istrators.
160
Shortly after his ruling, on August 30, 1971, eight days before fall
classes were to begin, ten Pontiac school buses were dynamited.161 The
investigation of the bombing led to the arrest and conviction of Robert
Miles, the Grand Dragon of Michigan's Ku Klux Klan.'
In the face of FBI warnings that the Klan had targeted him for an
assassination plot, Judge Keith called for his order to be implemented
as scheduled.'63 In remarking on his ability to withstand both political
pressure and even death threats, Judge Keith quotes the late Dr. Martin
Luther King Jr.: "Cowardice asks the question, is it safe? Expedience
asks the question, is it politic? Vanity asks the question, is it popular?
But conscience asks the question, is it right?""'
D. Housing Disimination: Garrett v. Ci0y of Hamtramck
The Gamtt v. City of Hamtramck trilogy'6" further exemplifies Judge
Keith's willingness to pierce alleged White innocence and unmask a
history and pattern of deliberate discrimination. Furthermore, Gamtt
Judge Keith in Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
See Davis, 443 F.2d at 577 n.1 (stating "[o]nce a right and a violation have been shown,
the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for
breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.").
159. See Melvin "Butch" Hollowell, When Courage Staed Down Bigoty, DET. NEWS,
Aug. 27, 1992, availabk at 1992 WL 6097734.
160. The United States Supreme Court"let stand" Judge Keith's massive bussing
plan. See Supreme Court Refuses to Upset Keith Rung on Pontiac Busing, DET. NEWS, Oct.
26,1971, at 1; see also School District of the City of Pontiac, Inc. v. Dais, 404 U.S. 913
(1971) (denying certiorari).
161. See Hollowell, supra note 159.
162. See id
163. See id
164. Id.
165. Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 335 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Garrett
v. City of Hamtramck, 357 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Mich. 1973); and Garrett v. City of
Hamtramck, 394 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
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typifies the vehemence and endurance of racist practices as well as
Judge Keith's equally potent ability to remediate proportionately with
the racist harm. In Gamtlt, Judge Keith found that defendants City of
Hamtramck, its Mayor, its City Planning Commission, and its
coordinator of urban renewal (collectively Hamtramck) deliberately
engaged in a program of "Negro Removal" designed to get rid of its
Black population.
166
i. Facts
In order to remove its Blacks, Hamtramck had, among other things,
turned residential areas into industrial sites and placed an expressway
through Black dwellings. 67 These activities coupled with racially
discriminatory private housing practices caused a decrease in
Hamtramck's Black population from 14.5% in 1960 to approximately
8.5% in 1966.16
As another example of invidious Hamtramck practices, eighteen
Black families lived in one portion of an area slated for "urban renewal"
in a row of consecutive multi-family flats while Whites occupied the
remainder of the homes in the same area.169 Hamtramck could not
establish that the condition of the Black-owned residences differed from
those of their White counterparts. 70 Nevertheless, Hamtramck
destroyed the Black-owned houses before it touched the White-owned
houses.17
1
2. Holding
Summarizing Hamtramck's "wrongdoing," Judge Keith stated "[t]he
defendants simply cannot surreptitiously permit and encourage
displacement of [B]lack residents from their homes.., without taking
reasonable steps to assure that housing for rental or purchase will be
made available to those displaced."172 Moreover, Judge Keith went on
166. Garrtt, 335 F. Supp. at 17.
167. See id at21.
168. See id at 21-22.
169. See id at 21.
170. See id
171. See id
172. Id at 25.
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to allocate responsibility for the "Negro Removal" at its source:
If what has occurred in Hamtramck is ever to be stopped,
responsibility must be placed at the source, thai: is, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development which funds
and administers the programs. It must be clearly understood
that in order for the City of Hamtramck to bring about the
"Negro removal" and ancillary discriminatory results of which
plaintiffs are complaining in this action, federal financial
assistance and involvement was essentiaL173
Ganett came before Judge Keith on November 20, 1968."7 As an
example of racism's endurance, Hamtramck had "through dilatory
tactics . . . delayed, attempted to delay, and frustrated the
implementation of any program to redress the grievous injustices for
which they ha[d] been responsible" well past May 21, 1975.17 Despite
Hamtramck's insolence and delay, Judge Keith was evenly matched for
the hold-out and continued to order defendants to build 515 to 604
replacement units17 6 and to contact the displaced Black residents, via
Black radio stations and newspapers, in order to determine if they
desired replacement housing in Hamtramck" As further evidence of
Judge Keith's tenacity, he retained jurisdiction of the case even after he
had been promoted to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, receiving
special permission to retain the case every year. In 2001, Judge Keith
ordered the homes be rebuilt
1 78
In sum, Gamtt v. City of Hamtramck,179like Baker v. Cy of Detroit,' '
Stamps v. Detroit Edison,"' and Davis v. SchoolDistrict of the City ofPontia 9 2
reflects Judge Keith's ability to ground both his adjudication and
173. Id at 25.
174. Gamtt, 394 F. Supp. at 1152.
175. Id at 1154.
176. See id
177. Seeid at 1156.
178. Judge Orders Housing in 33-Year Old Civil Rights Suit, DET. LEGAL NEWs, July
6, 2001, at 1.
179. Gamtt, 394 F. Supp. at 1151.
180. 483 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
181.365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
182. 309 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
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opinions in the reality of material subordination by fully historicizing an
exhaustive factual record. The breadth of the factual record and its
historical context provides a thorough record of racist policies and
practice. Yet, these opinions are refreshingly bold, particularly where
courts have polluted the landscape of anti-discrimination law with legal
opinions that obfuscate racism by deemphasizing historical reality. Each
of these cases is a veritable recipe for effective remediation.
E. Racial Profiling: United States v. Hav y and United States v. Taylor
Both Tayko and HareVy' involve the phenomenon of "driving or
walking while black," where law enforcement equates color with
criminality and, through the vehicle of racial profiling, subjects people
of color to discriminatory searches and seizures. In both of these cases,
Judge Keith dissented to the majority's finding of probable cause and
exposed the racially discriminatory practice.
1. Facts
In Taylor, the defendant was the only black person to deplane from
a Miami flight by the time he was stopped."' 5 In addition, the defendant
"walked away from the gate nervously, hurriedly and moved faster than
the other passengers; constantly looked backwards as he walked; carried
a tote bag that he held tightly to his body; and left the terminal walking
very fast."' According to the arresting officer's testimony, the officer
stopped the defendant because he was both dressed in dingy clothing
and nervous 87
In Harvy, law enforcement stopped the defendant because he was
driving "three miles over the speed limit in a car which was missing a
bumper and a headlight.' In addition, when asked "[w]hat was it
about the appearance of the occupants that got [his] attention,"18 9 the
arresting officer replied "[a]lmost every time that we have arrested drug
183. 956 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1992) (Keith, J. dissenting).
184. 16 F.3d 109 (6th Cir. 1994) (KeithJ. dissenting).
185. See Taylor, 956 F.2d at 582.
186. Id at 586 (enumeration omitted).
187. Id at 587.
188. Harvey, 16 F.3d at 113.
189. Id.
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traffickers from Detroit, they're usually young black males driving old
C 22S' 19 0
cars. 0
2. Anayliis
In Tqylor, Judge Keith began his dissent by cutting through to the
heart of the matter stating "[]aying aside the legality of the seizure and
the subsequent search of Taylor under established fourth amendment
principles for the moment, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
personnel stopped [defendant] ... solely because he was an African-
American."19' Furthermore,Judge Keith exposed the racial component
of the profiling methods employed:
The disproportionate number of African-Americans who
are stopped indicates that a racial imbalance against African-
Americans does exist and is implicitly sanctioned by the law
enforcement agency. The assumption that seventy-five percent
of those persons transporting drugs and other contraband
through public modes of transportation are African-American
is impermissible. It flies in the face of reason and legitimates a
negative stereotype of African-Americans. Surely, this practice
must "be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and [can be] justified
only by the weightiest of considerations." If our "right of
locomotion," "right to be let alone," or simply our right to be
free from capricious and arbitrary government interference in
public places is to mean anything, then this race-based practice
must stop.
We cannot allow law enforcement officers to cloak what
may fairly be characterized as a racist practice in a generic drug
courier profile that openly targets Affican-Ameicans.'"
190. Id.
191. Tajhr, 956 F.2d at 572.
192. Id at 581-82. In joiningJudge Keith's dissentJudge Martin, :1ow ChiefJudge
of the Sixth Circuit, stated
When I travel, I am typically attired in a suit and tie and behave in a
conventional manner. I doubt that I attract much attention from the airport
police, even though I may exhibit signs of nervousness or agitation due to
turbulence during a flight or a difficult connection. I face little, if any,
possibility ofbeing stopped. Perhaps it is my dress and manner, I believe that
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In challenging the majority's opinion in Harvy, Judge Keith related
the reality of racial profiling for Black people:
Unfortunately, the present case is not unique; rather, it
eloquently illustrates the plight of many African-Americans.
News reports detail unreasonable stops of African Americans
[sic] by police motivated solely by irrational and illogical racial
stereotypes. For example, a national newspaper reported "the
same percentages of whites and blacks use drugs." Arguably, for
every 100 people arrested for drug use or trafficking, 50 should
be black. Blacks, however, are four times as likely to be arrested
for drugs in central cities, six times as likely in suburbs, and
three times as likely in rural areas.... African-Americans are
more likely to be arrested because drug courier profiles reflect
the erroneous assumption that one's race has a direct
correlation to drug activity. 93
VI. RESISTANCE: THE EXPANSIVE VIEW APPLIED TO GENDER
In addition to maintaining a legal sensibility keenly sensitive to all
forms ofinjustice, Judge Keith has also reached beyond the subjectivity
of his own male experience, embraced the expansionist view in the
struggle for gender equality, and summoned the power of the court to
ameliorate the substantive power imbalance between men and women.
In Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 94 the Sixth Circuit majority held that
plaintiff failed to sustain her Title VII sexual harassment claim.1 9s
However, in his dissentJudge Keith characteristically (1) developed the
full factual record and (2) elaborated those facts within their historical
it is these factors combined with the fact that I am white. In stark
comparison, Mr. Taylor's deplaning begins a long journey down the slippery
slope to the past. The police officers testified that Mr. Taylor exhibited signs
of nervousness and agitation. It is apparent that because of his race and his
clothing in addition to his nervousness, Taylor was singled out as he
deplaned.
Id at 590.
193. Harvy, 16 F.3d at 114-15 (citing Sam Meddis, Suburbs Have Gotten OffEajy,'
Whites' DragAattiiy Often Better Hidden, USA ToDAY, July 26,1993, at 6A.)
194. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
195. See id, at 622.
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and material reality. Having exhausted the facts within the context of
gender inequality, Judge Keith established that the majority erred in
finding that "defendant's treatment of plaintiff evinced no anti-female
animus and that gender-based discrimination played no role in her
discharge."1 96
In addition to undermining the majority's opinion by exposing the
record, Judge Keith's dissent in Rabidue evinces a keen receptiveness to
pervasive issues in sexual harassment law that directly affect gender
equality. First, Judge Keith established that societal norms cannot set
the standard for the level of inequality women must tolerate in the
workplace as the majority suggested. Second, just as he understands the
disparate historical treatment of persons of color, Judge Keith, unlike
the majority, rejected gender neutral standards for assessing sexually
offensive conduct because gender-blind standards create a false
symmetry of power between men and women and mask the power
imbalance between the two.197 Third, Judge Keith took issue with the
majority's suggestion that women who work in environments infected
with misogyny voluntarily assume the risk of exposure. Finally, as in
cases involving race, particularly under the restrictive view of anti-
discrimination law, the majority opinion expressed an unwillingness to
use the courts to eradicate or correct the anti-female environment at
issue in Rabidue.Judge Keith, however, used the institution of the courts
to fulfill the vision of Title VII-workplace equality.
A. Judge Keith's Development and Contextuazation of the Facts within the
Material Rea'4 of Femak Subordination
The majority analysis in Rabidue violated "the most basic tenet of a
hostile work environment cause of action, the necessity of examining
the totality of the circumstances.""19 Instead of applying the "totality of
the circumstances" test, the majority evaluated each of plaintiff's
allegations separately and rejected each one as having a "de minimu.f'
196. Id. at 623.
197. See Deborah Zalense, The Intsecti'on of Sodoeconomic Class anf Gender in Hostik
Housing Enironment Caims under Title VIII Who is the Reasonabk Person?, 38 B.C. L. REV.
861, 864 (1997).
198. Robinson v.JacksonviUe Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, '1527 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
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effect on the workplace.1 The majority's opinion is particularly startling
in light of Osceola Refining Company's (defendant's) egregious
conduct' °° However, as is characteristic of Judge Keith, he (1) fully
developed the facts of the case and then (2) gave those facts meaning
by contextualizing them within the material reality of female
subordination and the power imbalance between men and women.
Although the majority failed to focus critically on the defendant's
behavior or elicit the following facts in its opinion, Judge Keith
characteristically developed the full factual record and presented the
following in support of his dissent:
One poster, which remained on a wall for eight years in
plaintiff's work environment, showed a prone woman who had'
a golf ball on her breasts with a man standing over her, golf
club in hand, yelling "Fore." A desk plaque declared "[e]ven
male chauvinist pigs need love."2 1 A supervisor "routinely
referred to women as 'whores,' 'cunt,' 'pussy,' and 'tits."' The
same supervisor, remarked of plaintiff that '[a]ll that bitch
needs is a good lay"' and called her "fat ass." When plaintiff
complained about such treatment, she was told to "calm down."
In addition to tolerating this anti-female behavior, defendant
excluded plaintiff, the sole female in management, from
activities she needed to perform her duties and progress in her
career. For example, unlike male salaried employees, plaintiff
did not receive free lunches, free gasoline, a telephone credit
card or entertainment privileges. Nor was she invited to the
199. See id
200. The majority opinion in Rabidue has been severely criticized by
commentators, courts, and the EEOC. See, e.g., Elron v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872,877 (9th
Cir. 1991) ("We do not agree with the standards set forth in... Rabidae.'); lp!ett P.
Univrsiy ofP.R., 864 F.2d 881,905 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting the dissent in Rabidgewith
approval); Robianon v. Jacksontilk Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1426, 1525 (MNLD. FIa. 1991)
(concluding "that the reasoning of these cases (including Rabidue) is not consistentwith
the Eleventh Circuit precedent and is otherwise unsound!); Policy Guidance on
Current Issues ofSexual Harassment, EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) No. 137, at N:4048
(Mar. 19, 1990) (hereinafter EEOC Policy Guidance) (rejecting the Rabidue rationale
regarding obscene materials in the workplace).
201. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 624.
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weekly golf matches.2 2 Defendant prevented plaintiff from
visiting or taking customers to lunch because it would be
improper for a woman to take male customers to lunch and
because she "might have car trouble on the road."2' 3 In a
"Catch 22," plaintiffs supervisor stated that "we really need a
man on [plaintiffs] job" and added that plaintiff "cm't take
customers out to lunch."
Presenting another "Catch-22," the majority found plaintiff "to
be an abrasive, rude, antagonistic, extremely willful,
uncooperative, and irascible personality."2°  Plaintiff's
supervisor, however, stated that "plaintiff was not forceful
enough to collect slow-paying jobs."2 ° Judge Keith, noting the
irony, stated "[h]ow plaintiff can be so abrasive and aggressive
as to require firing but too timid to collect delinquent accounts
is, in my view, an enigma."2'
B. Rejection of Sodetal Norms that Peroetuate the StatusoQuo
The majority opinion went out of its way to etphasize the
plaintiff's aggressive and cantankerous personality' 7  while
simultaneously excusing defendant's offensive conduct.2 " Unlike the
majority, however, Judge Keith's dissent recognizes thai: the pivotal
issue under Title VII is the defendant's conduct,2 9 not the victim's,
202. See id. "The district court below dismissed these perks and business activities
as ftinge benefits." Id
203. Id
204. Id at 615.
205. Id at 624.
206. Id
207. See id at 615 (critically describing the plaintiff as "a capable, independent,
ambitious, aggressive, intractable, and opinionated individual)." Id "It.is arguable that
these characteristics would not have been so offensive to the court if they had been
attributed to a male officer manager." Deanna Weisse Turner, CGiilRis---mploers
Beware: The Supreme Court's Rejection of the PRyhological Injury Requirement in Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 376 (1993), Makes It EaderforBmpoy'es to Establish a
Claim for Sexual Harassment Based on a Hostik Working Enmronment, 17 U. ARK. LITImE
ROCKL.J. 839, 857 n.153 (1995).
208. See Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 615.
209. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1994).
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particularly not the victim's reaction to sexually offensive conduct in
light of societal norms that may actually reinforce gender discrimination.
In RabidueJudge Keith refused to let societal norms dictate the measure
of inequality women must tolerate in the workplace. According to judge
Keith, societal norms are no excuse for the debilitating effects of
pornography in the workplace.
C. Reasonabk Woman Standard
Just as he has recognized the difference race has made, Judge Keith,
unlike the majority, rejected gender neutral standards of assessing
sexually offensive conduct in Rabidue because he recognized that
gender-blind standards create a false symmetry of power between men
andwomen and mask the power imbalance between the two.21 0 Instead,
Judge Keith introduced the reasonable woman standard to account for
not only the differences of perception between the sexes,"' but also the
difference in power. While other courts have adopted the reasonable
woman standard,212Judge Keith has been credited with introducing the
210. Several commentators have argued that the "reasonable person" standard is
a male defined norm masquerading as objectivity. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Dill, The
Reasonabk Woman's Standard in SexualHararswent Litigation, 12 ME. B.J. 154,155 (1997)
(stating "this so called 'reasonable person' standard, when used in hostile environment
cases, has the effect of imposing a male bias and therefore prejudices the fights of
female plaintiffs. The argument, in sum, is that we live in a patriarchal society where
men are the measure of all things and women are evaluated according to their
correspondence with men. When the factfinder is asked to determine whether or not
a reasonable person would consider the environment sufficiently severe or abusive to
be actionable under Title VII, the reasonable person is, in fact, the reasonable man.").
211. See Zalesne, supra note 197, at 871 (stating "[s]tudies show that because
women have not historically held power positions, men and women often have
different perspectives regarding what conduct constitutes sexual harassment.
According to a joint survey byRedbook managazine and the Harvard Business Review
on sexual harassment in the workplace, '[m]ost people agree on what harassment is.
But men and women disagree strongly on how frequently it occurs.' The study showed
that actions deemed harassment by women were often perceived as harmless by men.
The report concluded that '[flrom the comments in the returns, a visitor from another
planet might conclude that men and women work in separate organizations."'
(citations and footnotes omitted)).
212. Inspired by Judge Keith's dissent in Rabidue, the Ninth Circuit adopted the
reasonable woman standard in Elison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-90 (9th Cir. 1991).
Writing for the majority, Judge Breezer explained "because women are
disproportionately victims of rape and sexual assault, women have a stronger incentive
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reasonable woman standard in case law. 213
Just as colorblindness is used to erect the status quo and mask a
vision that is white, Judge Keith understood that genderl.ess standards
of assessing offensive conduct would only assume the current
distribution of power, namely male. In justifying the reasonable woman
standard, Judge Keith stated:
Nor can I agree with the majority's notion that the effect of pin-
up posters and misogynous language in the workplace can have
only a minimal effect on female employees and shotld not be
deemed hostile or offensive "when considered in the context of
a society that condones and publicly features and commercially
exploits open displays of written and pictorial erotica at
newsstands, on prime-time television, at the cinema and in
other public places." "Society" in this scenario must primarily
refer to the unenlightened; I hardly believe reasonable women
condone the pervasive degradation and exploitation of female
sexuality perpetuated in American culture. In fact, pervasive
to be concerned with sexual behavior. Womenwho are victims of mild forms of sexual
harassment may understandably worry whether a harasser's conduct is merely a
prelude to violent sexual assault. Men, who are rarely victims of sexual assault, may
view sexual conduct in a vacuum without full appreciation of the social setting or the
underlying threat of violence that a woman may perceive." Idt at 879. In addition, the
court concluded that the reasonable woman standard was an essential tool for
defeating ingrained sexist stereotypes and prejudices. See idt at 881. The Sixth Circuit
itself, in Hixson v. Nofolk Southern Railway Co., held that a constructive discharge due
to sexual harassment occurs if "working conditions [are] so difficult o: unpleasant that
a reasonable [woman] in the employee's shoes would [feel] compelled to resign." No.
94-5832, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 15421, *15 (6th Cir. June 10, 1996) (unpublished)
(citing Yates v. Acco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636-37 (6th Cir. 1987)).
As another advantage of the "reasonable woman" standard, "i]n cases involving
violence againstwomen, the reasonable woman standard serves to change the woman's
subordination by increas[ng] the potential for effective enforcement of laws against
subordinatingbehavior. Specifically, the reasonablewoman standard includeswomen's
experiences in a system with asymmetrical power relations that has historically
excluded women's participation." Zalesne, su ra note 197, at 871 (internal citations and
footnotes omitted).
213. See Deborah B. Goldberg, The Road to Equa'y: TheApfication ofthe Reasonabk
Woman Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 2 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 195, 200-01
(1995); Penny L. Cigoy, Comment, Harmkss Amusement or Sexual Harassment?: The
Reasonabkness of the Rasonabk Woman Standard, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 1071, 1079 (1993).
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societal approval thereof and of other stereotypes stifles female
potential and instills the debased sense of self worth which
accompanies stigmatization. The presence of pin-ups and
misogynous language in the workplace can only evoke and
confirm the debilitating norms by which women are primarily
and contemptuously valued as objects of male sexual fantasy.
That some men would condone and wish to perpetuate such
behavior is not surprising. However, the relevant inquiry at
hand is what the reasonable woman would find offensive, not
society, which at one point also condoned slavery. I conclude
that sexual posters and anti-female language can seriously affect
the psychological well being of the reasonable woman and
interfere with her ability to perform her job.2"4
Having contextualized the facts of Rabidue within their historical
context, Judge Keith demonstrated that women disproportionately
suffer the brunt of sexual harassment and gender bias."'5 Unlike the
adherents to the restrictive view of anti-discrimination law, Judge Keith
established that the legal system must account for the woman's
perspective regarding appropriate behavior. According to judge Keith,
the reasonable person standard failed because it did not reflect women's
perceptions of what constitutes sexual harassment. The reasonable
woman standard, on the other hand, evaluates the conduct from the
woman's perspective and thus minimizes the risk of reinforcing the
prevailing level of sexual harassment in society.2 6
214. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 627 (internal citations omitted).
215. See Zalesne, .ipra note 197, at 876.
216. As another example ofhowgenderless standards implicitly assume the male-
oriented distribution of power and paradigm, Jeanne L. Schroeder uses the example
ofwomen and self-defense. Initially, "womenwho killed menin self-defense often had
to plead insanity.... because their actions did not meet the prevailing legal elements
of self-defense. These elements were based on the male perspective and the paradigm
of the bar room brawl between two men of relatively equal strength .... Male judges
and legislatures initially could not accept the theory proposed by women-that it is
self-defense for a small woman to use a gun against a large, drunken, but unarmed
man-because itis not the theory that would initially occur to men who are differently
situated. Consequently, to defend themselves, women had to adopt the dominant
characterization of their thought as irrational in the literal, pejorative sense and had to
characterize their behavior as insane." Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abductionfrom the Seraglio:
Feminist Metbodolo#es and the Lo4c ofImaination, 70 TEX. L. REV. 109, 119 n.29 (1991)
20011 1209
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
D. Assumption of Risk
The majority excused the work atmosphere in Rabidve stating that
courts must consider the "prevailing work environment," "the lexicon
of obscenity that pervaded the environment both before and after
plaintiff's introduction into its environs," and plaintiff's reasonable
expectations upon "voluntarily" entering that environment."7 The
majority further suggested that it is "through these factors that a woman
assumes the risk of working in an abusive anti-female environment"21
In other words, the majority implicitly supported the notion that female
employees assume the risk of sexual harassment when they enter male-
dominated, traditionally vulgar, and mysogonistic work environments.
By contrast, Judge Keith rejected the majority's voluntary
assumption of risk suggestion and stated "I conclude the misogynous
language and decorative displays tolerated at the refinery, (which even
the district court found constituted a 'fairly significant' part of the job
environment), the primitive views of working women expressed by
Osceola supervisors, and defendant's treatment of plaintiff as the only
female salaried employee clearly evince anti-female animus."2 19
E. Summoning the Power of the Court to Effect Equaliy
As in cases involving race under the restrictive view of anti-
discrimination law, the majority opinion expressed an unwillingness to
use the courts to eradicate or correct the anti-female environment in
Rabidue. Beyond the mere tolerance of such environments, the majority
suggested that such work environments have an innate right to
perpetuation and are not to be addressed under Title VII:
Indeed, it cannot seriously be disputed that in some work
environments, humor and language are rough hewn and vulgar.
(citing Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Diakctic of Rights and Po/tir Perspectives from the
Women'sMovement, 61 N.Y.U.L. REV. 589,606-10 (1986)). When feministlegal activists
exposed the assumptions behind the dominant theory and gave voice to the female
perspective, "male as well as female lawyers began to see the rationality not only of the
new theory, but of women as well." Id
217. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620.
218. Id. at 626.
219. Id at 625 (Keith, J., dissenting).
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Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines may
abound. Tide VII was not meant to-or cannot-change this.
It must never be forgotten that Title VII is the federal court
mainstay in the struggle for equal employment opportunity for
the female worker of America. But it is quite different to claim
that Title VII was designed to bring about a magical
transformation in the social mores of American workers.' 2°
In response to the majority's judicially restraining Title VII in the
sexual harassment field, Judge Keith stated that the majority had
undermined the very purpose of Tide VII, which was the promotion of
social change and equality in the workplace by perpetuating working
environments hostile to women:
In my view, Title VII's precise purpose is to prevent such
behavior and attitudes from poisoning the work environment
.... To condone the majority's notion of the "prevailing
workplace" I would also have to agree that if an employer
maintains an anti-Semitic workforce and tolerates a workplace
in which "dke" jokes, displays of Nazi literature and anti-Jewish
conversation "may abound," a Jewish employee assumes the
risk of working there, and a court must consider such a work
environment as "prevailing." I cannot... as I believe no
woman should be subjected to an environment where her
sexual dignity and reasonable sensibilities are visually, verbally
or physically assaulted as a matter of prevailing male
prerogative, I dissent"'
VII. EQUALrIY AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS
Judge Keith has reached beyond the subjectivity of his own life to
create a more equitable world for everyone. His keen sensitivity to an
abuse of power is not isolated to cases involving race and gender
discrimination; rather, the same level of sensitivity and effective
adjudication thatJudge Keith applies to cases involving race and gender
equally applies to cases involving governmental abuse of power against
220. Id at 621.
221. Id at 626-27 (KeithJ., dissenting).
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its citizens. One famous example marks Judge Keith's adherence to
principle even in the face of peril: United States v. Sinclair,2' There,
despite overwhelming political pressures, particularly from the Office
of the PresidentJudge Keith protected every citizen from. the uninvited
ear of the government The same fortitude and courage that enabled
Judge Keith to triumph over the forces of hegemony in his own life
enabled him to resist political pressure and ensure the privacy rights of
every citizen. In another set of examples, Judge Keith protected the
rights of every citizen, even a corrupt governor, to a fair trial. In sum,
each of the following cases further exemplifies Judge Keith's
commitment to equality in all of its many dimensions.
A. The Keith Case: United States v. Sinclair
Judge Keith's keen sensitivity to equality and his own experiences
of exclusion coupled with his unyielding sense of fortitude and bold
courage directed him in United States v. Sinclair,' perhaps his most
legendary case. 24 In Sinclair, notwithstanding the office of the
presidency and President Nixon's enormous popularity at the time,'
Judge Keith held that the Constitution prohibited President Richard
Nixon, Attorney General John Mitchell, and the federal government 6
from wiretapping the residence of the White Panthers, a ichigan-
based political dissident group, whom the government had accused of
conspiring to bomb a CIA building, unless a warrant had been issued
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 7 The Supreme Court
unanimously upheld Judge Keith's decision, which became known as
"the Keith case."
Beyond the specific facts or particular parties before the court, 9 the
222.321 F. Supp. 1074 (E.D. Mich. 1971), af dsub nom, United States v. United
States District Court, 444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir.), aft'd, 407 U.S. 297 (19*72).
223. See ido
224. As a result of his ruling in Sinchdr,Judge Keith is one of the :few sitting jurists
ever to be sued by a United States president. See WASHINGTON, san; note 44, at 113.
225. See Melvin "Butch" HollowelJr.,Judge Damon Keith's Wiretap Case, MICH.BAR
J. 1202 (1987).
226. See Bob Talbert, Curent Cris Has Echoes in Wliretap Ruhng, IET. FREE PRESS,
Jan. 30,1998, at 3C.
227. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. at 1079.
228. See Hollowell, supra note 225, at 1201.
229. As the Sixth Circuit recognized on appeal, "[a]t issue in this .aseis the power
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decision in Sinclair shielded the privacy rights of every United States
citizen from the government's "uninvited ear." Apprehending the need
to protect every citizen's rights against governmental abuse,Judge Keith
squarely confronted the executive branch of the government and stated:
The great umbrella of personal rights protected by the Fourth
Amendment has unfolded slowly, but very deliberately,
throughout our legal history.'
The final buttress to this canopy of Fourth Amendment
protection is derived from the [Supreme] Court's declaration
that the Fourth Amendment protects a defendant from the evil
of the uninvited ear.3
It is to be remembered that the protective sword which is
sheathed in the scabbard of Fourth Amendment rights, and
which insures that these fundamental rights will remain
inviolate, is the well-defined rule of exclusion. And, in turn, the
cutting edge of the exclusionary rule is the requirement that the
Government obtain a search warrant before it can conduct a
lawful search and seizure. It is this procedure of obtaining a
warrant that inserts the impartial judgment of the Court
between the citizen and the Government."2
In articulating the impact of Judge Keith's ruling, the PuZZle Palace,
a widely celebrated book on the National Security Agency ("NSA") and
the pervasive influence of America's intelligence community, reported
thatJudge Keith's "[o]rder rocked the NSA,23" because it exposed that
organization's questionable practices of electronic surveillance.
Historian Jeff A. Hale has stated that "Keith has become one of the
of the Attorney General of the United States as agent of the President to authorize
wiretapping in internal security matters without judicial sanction. This case has
importance far beyond its facts or the litigants concerned." United States v. United
States District Court, 444 F.2d 651, 653 (6th Cir. 1971).
230. Sincdair, 321 F. Supp. at 1077 (citations omitted).
231. Id (citations omitted).
232. Id at 1078.
233. J. BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE 291 (1982).
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foundations of our modem conception of privacy tights."'
Ironically, the individual who has devoted his life to equality,
particularly for those who have been denied it, is the same individual
who has championed the rights of everyone, including -the privileged.
This touch of irony is illustrated in the following excerpt from a
conversation between Henry Ford and Judge Keith, in Judge Keith's
own words:
I remember my good friend Henry Ford said to me after the
wiretap case, "Damon, what is this wiretapping case all about
that everybody is talking about."
I said, "Well, Henry, if you and your wife were having a private
conversation, the government would say that Henry Ford and
his wife are having a conversation that may be a th-reat to the
national security. Once they declared the conversation a threat
to the national security, they could wiretap your telephone
without going before a neutral magistrate and showing probable
cause that what you are saying was actually a threat to this
country. The government could do it alone. If Nixon and John
Mitchell wanted to intercept telephone calls they could do it just
by invoking national security. National security would be their
defense." I told Henry that the Supreme Court decision in that
lawsuit against me prohibited the Nixon administration, the
government, from wiretapping without judicial approval. Henry
said, "My goodness, I would never have believed it."'
In addition to securing privacy rights, Sinclair exemplifies the
importance of an independent judiciary. Author Joseph C. Goulden
reflected on Judge Keith's contribution to the independence of the
judiciary in the following excerpt from his book, The Benchwarmer.
Keith's action... is a prime example of an independent
Federal Judge interposing his authority between an executive
action and the general citizenry. As the public knows through
234. Bob Talbert, Current Crisi Has Echoes in Wiretap Ru'n/* DET. FREEPRESS,Jan.
30,1998, at 3C (quotingJeff A. Hale).
235. WAsHINGTON, supra note 44, at 115.
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the various Watergate-released disclosures, the Nixon
administration had grandiose schemes for surveillance of
domestic "enemies," political and otherwise; warrantless
wiretapping of the sort used against [one of the plaintiffs in
Sincair] was a key weapon. ButJudge Damon Keith, a jurist not
answerable to a presidency which likened itself to a "sovereign"
had the courage to say "no" ....
The strength of the judiciary is rooted in just such
independence as that displayed by Keith." 6
In remarking on the case, Judge Keith stated "I feel honored as a
federal district judge to have made a ruling that protects the rights of all
Americans. This is a country of laws and not of men. No one is above
the law. That's what makes this country so great. '
B. ProsecutorialMisconduct
In United States v. Blanton, Judge Keith's sense of justice remained
vigilant even in the face of a governor whose administration reeked of
corruption.' There, former Governor Leonard R. Blanton was charged
and convicted of various violations after he arranged for friends to
receive liquor licenses from the state of Tennessee3 9 True to form,
Judge Keith expressed his concerns for justice stating "[t]his case,
however, concerns something that is more important and
fundamental-a man's liberty and his right to a fair trial. Under our
system of justice, everyone, including an allegedly corrupt ex-governor,
is entitled to a fair trial before a fair and impartial jury of his peers-no
more and no less."24
In another example of Judge Keith's sensitivity to prosecutorial
misconduct, and also in light of recent accusations of mishandled
236. J. GOULDEN, THE BENCHWARMERS, THE PRIVATE WORLD OF THE
POWERFUL FEDERALJUDGES 351 (1974).
237. Roshonda Haley, Paque Honoring Damon Kith Recalls Sterng Time in Judal
Hirtog, DET. NEWS, July 9, 1997.
238.719 F.2d 815 (6th Cir. 1983) (KeithJ. dissenting).
239. See id at 817.
240. Id at 846 (Keith, J. dissenting).
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investigations involving President Clinton,24' United States v. Bess,242
further exemplifies Judge Keith's sensitivity toward justice and
impartiality, specifically the rights of every citizen to a fair trial. In Bess,
the United States Attorney's office had prosecuted plaintiff for
concealing and retaining scrap metal from a military reservation.243
During the trial, the United States Attorney, engaged in prosecutorial
vouching stating that "[i]f the United States did not believe the
defendant was guilty of committing these charges in the indictment,
based on the evidence that has been presented to you, this case, of
course, would have never been presented to you in the first place."24
In admonishing the United States Attorney, Judge Keith wrote
"[t]he function of the prosecutor under the Federal Constitution is not
to tack as many skins of victims as possible to the wall. His function is
to vindicate the right of people as expressed in the laws and give those
accused of crime a fair trial."'24
241. See Donna Abu-Nasr, C'nton Aies Callfor Invesgation to Cease, Stair to Go,
ASSOC. PRESS POLITICAL SERV., Mar. 2, 1998 (quoting Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt,
"Starr has gotten totally out of control. He has this fixation of trying to topple the
president of the United States. He's doing everything possible to do it.').
242. 593 F.2d 749 (6th Cir. 1979).
243. Id at 749.
244. Id. at 753.
245. Id at 754 (quoting Donnel4 v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648-49 (1974)
(Douglas,J. dissenting)). As yet another example ofJudge Keith's compassion for the
wrongfully abused, regardless of race, gender, religion, or class, Judge Keith wrote the
following dissent in response to a police barricade that left a man, O'Brien, paralyzed:
Describing the unacceptable and outrageous actions taken by officers in this
case as "reasonable" offends the competency and professionalism practiced
by the overwhelming majority of officers across the nation. Recognizing
O'Brien presented "no overt, hostile threat" and there was no probable cause
to believe he committed any crime, only unreasonable and overzealous
officers would harass and persecute O'Brien by surrounding his home and
breaking its windows. In this case, the officers' refusal to obtain a warrant
from a neutral and detached magistrate, despite the passing of several hours,
resembles the self-righteous arrogance of a lynch mob. Unfortunately, the
officers' overactive imaginations, irrational paranoia and aggressive conduct
incited a scenario which left O'Brien paralyzed.
O'Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 1006 (6th Cir. 1994).
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VIII. AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: DIRECT EVIDENCE FOR DIVERSITY ON
THE BENCH
President Jimmy Carter was the first Chief Executive to pledge
expressly to increase the number of "women and minorities on the
federal bench."24 Despite this laudable goal, many view African
American judges with suspicion and see them as a salve for narrow,
parochial interests rather than a benefit to the judicial system as a
whole.247 At the core of this suspicion lies the belief that only Whites are
capable of impartiality. For example, in Baker . Ciy of Detroit,2 White
police officers challenging the Detroit Police Department's affirmative
action plan sought to recuse Judge Keith allegedly because he was an
acquaintance of one of the nominal defendants, African American
Mayor Coleman Young. In rejecting the recusal motion, Judge Keith
candidly remarked:
The reality of life is that only a small number of [B]lack persons
have been elevated to positions of responsibility in our national
life. It therefore is highly likely, especially in a predominantly
[B]Iack city like Detroit, that a [B]lack Federal Judge would
know, on a friendship basis, a [B]lack Mayor.249
Furthermore,Judge Keith identified the true basis of the recusal motion
as premised not on his acquaintance with Mayor Young, but rather on
his race:
The conclusion is inescapable that the likely grounds upon
which plaintiffs' motion is based is the fact that I am [B]liack,
that Mayor Young is [B]lack, that this action was brought by
[W]hite policemen seeking to challenge the affirmative action
program in the Detroit Police Department..
246. See Carl Tobias, Inmradng Balance on the FederalBench, 32 HOUs. L. REV. 137,
140 (1995) (citing Steve McGonigle, C'nton'sJudges Chaning the Face ofFedralJudidagy,
BATON ROUGEADVOC., Sept 5,1994, at 7B (noting that President Carter is "credited
with being the first president to stress diversity on the federal bench!)).
247. See Ifill, stura note 17, at 118.
248.458 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Mich. 1978); see supra Part V.A.
249. Baker, 458 F. Supp. at 377.
250. Id
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Although the White police officers attempted to mask a critique of
Judge Keith's impartiality, Judge Keith was able to respond with an
impeccable record of service on the federal bench. Judge Keith
countered that the White police officers "can point to n.o instance in
which this Court has conducted proceedings in this matter in anything
but a fair and impartial manner.""1 Furthermore, in another case in
which Judge Keith presided, Judge Keith noted that in Bars & Stipes,
the official publication of the Detroit Police Lieutenants and Sergeants
Association, which was one of the plaintiffs in Bake, noted the
following-
The (Lieutenants and Sergeants) Association owes much to
Judge Damon Keith. Judge Keith displayed compassion,
concern and fairness in acting as an arbitrator in this matter
The allegory of the recusal motion in Baker and Judge Keith's
response exemplify evidence for diversity on the bench. In the face of
racist critiques of impartiality, Judge Keith has countered with an
impeccable record of sensitivity to both race and gender bias, and also
justice. Judge Keith exemplifies the value of a dive:sified bench
informed by a diversity of life experiences. Furthermore, the same
power Judge Keith uses to resist hegemony has enabled him to fortify
the rights of every citizen against extreme political pressure and death
threats. The strength that enables him to be a Black man in the United
States inspires his ability to protect the rights of all citizens. Rather than
exhibiting partiality, Judge Keith has been an engine for equality for all
citizens. Judge Keith's personal experiences with hegemony have
created in him a greater allegiance to the protection of rghts.' 3
251. Id
252. Id at 378 (quoting 10 BARS & STRIPES July 1975, at 1-2).
253. In articulating the "feminist standpoint" theory, Nancy -irtsock suggests
that because men and women occupy different material existences, the female
standpoint is more adequate than that of males and better situates women to anticipate
the consciousness of the next stage in the development of material society. See Nancy
L. M Hartsock, The Feminist Standpoint. Deveoping the Ground for a Spedfcal Feninrt
Historical Matialism, in FEMINISM & METHODOLOGY (Sandra Harding ed., 1987).
Hartsock's analysis is based on the Hegelian-Marxian analysis of cassical Greek slave-
holding society. The material existence of the master and slave enabled the slave to
acquire a consciousness more adequate than the consciousness of the master. Slave-
consciousness made the contradictions of the slave-holding society apparent. Slave-
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Moreover, Judge Keith's hegemonically-informed consciousness is
not isolated to race; rather, Judge Keith's keen awareness of injustice
has also benefitted every citizen, including white privileged citizens.
Despite racist critiques concerning the inability of Blacks to be
impartial, Judge Keith is an example of a Black man using his sensitivity
toward justice to benefit the rights of all. Moreover, the diversity that
Judge Keith's presence brings to the bench has provided an example for
our entire justice system. A presence which both practitioners and other
judges have not only recognized, but applauded.
A Imlartiak"y Thromugh Diversiy
Because majority and minority groups occupy different social spaces
and because knowledge is "socially positioned," majority and minority
groups adhere to different epistemologies."4 This is not to say that all
Blacks think exactly alike or all women think alike; however, race,
gender, and class determine life experiences and inform perspectives.255
For example, competition for resources, acceptance of the status quo,
and rejection of hegemony have all produced many perspectives that are
sometimes sharply at odds with each other. The current attack on
affirmative action programs reveals a deep racial divide. 6 Most Whites
consciousness (stoicism) eventually became the universal consciousness of the next
stage in the development of society, Roman Imperialism. See Jeanne L. Schroeder,
Abduction fom the Seraglio: Feminist Metbodooges and the Logc ofImagination, 70 TEXAS L.
REV. 109, 210 n.296 (1991) (citing G.W.F. Hegel, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE
MIND 234-40 (.B. Baille trans. 2d ed. Harper & Row 1967) (1807)) (stating "[i n the
master, the bondsman feels self-existence to be something external, an objective fact;
in fear self-existence is present within himself, in fashioning the thing, self-existence
comes to be felt explicitly as his own proper being and he attains the consciousness
that he himself exists in its own right and on its own account. .. '..
Hartsock's material reality assumes the material reality of privileged white men,
not underprivileged men of color. InHartsock's analysis "power" is mislabeled "male"
when what is meant is white male. However, with that critique aside, arguably the
experience of material subordination at the hands of dominance, whether male, white,
or both, creates a greater awareness of injustice. It is this awareness, informed by
hegemony, that Judge Keith brings to the bench.
254. See If1, smpranote 17, at 141 (citingRichard Delgado &Jean Stefancic, Nms
and Narrativs: Can Judges Avoid Seious Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1956-57
(1991)).
255. See Varqas, spra note 71, at 197-98.
256. Seeid
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oppose affirmative action as a policy of group quotas or preferences. 7
Most racial minorities support affirmative action as a way to combat the
hegemonic force of race." On the gender front, the media has helped
to popularize the notion that men and women communicate and
perceive differently, and that men and women have distinct values and
different orientations toward problem solving5 9
Because different life experiences inform different ways of knowing,
the bench should reflect this diversity." ° Moreover, pluralist
communicative democracy embraces the value of including all members
of the polity and treating them as equal, coparticipants in constructing
the fundamental values of the polity.James Madison, in FedralistNo. 39,
emphasized inclusion of all the polity's members as fundamental to the
constitution of democracy. Exclusion of significant sectors of a polity
"degrade[s] ... the republican character" of the government, because
257. See id at 155 (citing Afmative Action: Republcans Praiin! Sureme Court's
Ruhng, ATLANTA J. CONST., June 13, 1995, avai/abk at 1995 WL 6529562 (reporting
that close to 80% of [Wihites expressed the view that "qualified minorities should not
receive preference over equally qualified jWhites")); see also DINESH D'SouzA, THE
END OF RACISM PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY 215 (1995) (arguing that
affirmative action is equivalent to group quotas); DANIEL YANK.ELOVICH, How
CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY ARE RESHAPING AMERICAN VALUES, IN VALUES AND
PUBLIC POLICY 16, 29-33 (HenryJ. Aaron et al. eds., 1994) (advocatrng that because
Americans value individualism and meritocracy highly, policy makers should
reconsider affirmative action policies)).
258. See Vargas, supranote 71, at 156 (citing ORLANDO PATTERSON, THE ORDEAL
OF INTEGRATION: PROGRESS AND RESENTMENT IN AMERICA'S 'RACAL" CRISIS 147-
69 (1997)) (examining poll data on affirmative action programs); Susan Sturm & LaniGuinier, The Future ofAfirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV.
953, 953 (1996) (describing a broad-based assault on affirmative action).
259. See Vargas, supra note 71, at 155-56 (1999) (citing JOHN GRAY, MEN ARE
FROM MARS, WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS at 59-91 (1992)) (teaching couples how to
communicate better in light of gender differences); Malcolm Gladwell Listening to
Khakis; What Ameica s Most Popular Pants Tell Us About the Way Gu.ys 7hink, THE NEW
YORKER,July 28,1997, at 54 (discussing how Levi Strauss & Co. marketed its Dockers
collection by focusing on the way men talk to each other): Deborah Tannen, How to
Give Orders Like a Man, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1994 (Magazine), at 46 (challenging the
assumption that talking in an indirect way, which is characteristic of women's mode
ofcommunication, reveals character flaws); CAROL GILIGAN, INADIFFERENTVOICE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (analyzing through
psychological research and literary texts the different modes in which raen and women
describe the relationship between self and other)).
260. See Vargas, supra note 71, at 197-98.
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"[]t is essential to a [republican] government that it be derived from the
great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a
favored class of it" 26'
Judicial decision-making is most effective, conscious, and
representative when it is informed by the variety of perspectives and
qualities that race, gender, and class generate. To that degree, structural
impartiality is realized through the interaction of diverse viewpoints on
the bench and the resulting decreased opportunity for one perspective
to dominate consistently judicial decision-making.
Judge Keith's presence on the bench demonstrates the most
compelling reasons for diversity among judges. He paradigmatically
exemplifies racial diversity in the courts promoting, rather than
undermining, impartiality.' The hegemonic force of race not only
informs his life, but also the opinions he expresses on the bench. Thus,
he promotes impartiality because his presence negates the possibility of
any viewpoint, perspective, or set of values that is not informed by life
experiences shaped by the brunt of hegemony from persistently
dominating legal decision making. In fact, his presence functions as a
check on bias.' Judge Keith's jurisprudence demonstrates that
increased diversity enhances the judiciary's understanding of complex
public policy issues, such as securing and retaining employment,
education, and housing.
Furthermore, Judge Keith has demonstrated that minority judges
not only decrease both racial and gender bias in the courts, but also
increase the level of sensitivity to injustice generally. His opinions
establish that racial minorities bring a legal acumen to the bench that is
enhanced by marginalization, but not limited to issues solely involving
race. Judge Keith's presence on the bench demonstrates that, given the
subordinated role of minorities in the social, economic, and political life
of our country, increasing racial diversity on the bench results in the
inclusion of alternative perspectives reflective of other kinds of
subordination-such as gender and class.2  Moreover, Judge Keith's
sensitivity toward justice has protected every citizen, rich and poor,
261. The FEDERALIST NO. 39 at 112 (ames Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d
ed. 1981).
262. See general Ifill, supra note 17, at 119.
263. Seegeneralb iL at 120.
264. See general id at 121-22.
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from the dangers of unrestrained power in the hands of government.
B. A Role Modelfor the Bench
Judge Keith has not only educated his colleagues through the
example he sets, but also by informal as well as formal exchanges. 65
Aside from the manifestation of his character and sensibility in his
judicial opinions, other practitioners have gone on record to attest to
Judge Keith's gentlemanly-like quality. An ongoing theme in the many
accolades paid to Judge Keith is his sensitivity and commitment to
treating everyone under all conditions with basic human courtesy and
respect. As an example, in his autobiography, MY LIFE AS A RADICAL
LAWYER (1994), William M. Kunstler described his appearance before
Judge Keith in the White Panther case, United States v. Sinclair, as follows:
In Chicago, where Judge Hoffman turned off and didn't want
to deal with anything and the marshals in the courtroom were
often confrontational, the defendants reacted accordingly. But
the White Panther case was very different. I am often asked
how judges can stop disruptive trials. One answer is to have
more judges like Damon Keith. On the first day of trial, he
called the prosecutors and defense lawyers into his chambers
for a conference; he served, as I recall, very delicious buns and
coffee. He broadly hinted to Len and me that he did not expect
this trial to be similar to Chicago. We assured him that unless
we had the same type of provocations that permeated the
Chicago trial, we didn't expect any difficulties.2
In a similar vein, of the many accolades thatJudge Keith holds dear,
one of the most telling came from a juror. The unnamed juror sat
through an eight-month trial and twenty-seven hours of deliberations
regarding the notorious "Tony Jack" Giacalone, an alleged mafia kin
pin. In remarking on the deliberations, the juror said, "[i]t was painful,
really hard, but we tried to be as fair and honest as we believed the
265. See general Sheldon Goldman, Should There Be Airmativ Action for the
Judidary?, 62JUDICATURE 488,494 (1979).
266. Littlejohn, rpra note 40, at 329.
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judge was during the trial."
In remarking on Judge Keith's innate sense of fairness to everyone,
including an alleged mafia boss, Giacalone's own defense attorneys'
echoed such praise when "they said repeatedly on the record that their
client was getting a fair trial."2 Judge Keith himself has remarked:
I am constantly alert to treat the lawyers who appear before me
with the dignity and respect they deserve as officers of the
court-something that Black lawyers often didn't get when I
practiced. In my [thirty-two] years on the bench, I have never
held nor threatened to hold a lawyer or anyone else in contempt
of court3 7
9
In addition to his diplomatic and gentlemanly character on the
bench, Judge Keith has set an example for diversity in his own hiring
selections. He has employed and mentored more than twenty-five
female law clerks27 and more than fifty law clerks of color, more than
267. Robert Ankeny,Judge Keth Praire: Giacalone the TrialJrorx, DET. NEWS, May 7,
1976, at 4A. As another example of Judge Keith's demeanor on the bench, Cynthia
Grant, a juror, wrote the following to Judge Keith:
As a recent federal court juror, I found the experience both stimulating
and enlightening ... Although I learned a great deal about our federal court
system, the highlight of my service was the opportunity to serve as a juror in
your court ... Your sense of fairness, respect and consideration for all
concerned was evident throughout the proceedings. Having seen you in
action it is not difficult to understand why you are ChiefJudge of the Federal
District Court. Yours is an example all can learn from.
Letter from Cynthia J. Grant (uly 8,1976).
268. Ankeny, supra note 267, at 4A.
269. Littlejohn, supra note 40, at 329.
270. As another example of Judge Keith's commitment to equality, one of his
prized letters is from Ginger Kent. OnJune 18,1997, Ms. Kent wrote to thankJudge
Keith for his ruling in a case, which the Sixth Circuit later affirmed, Morris v. Michigan
State Ba of Edum., 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1973). In Moris, two high school girls
challenged a Michigan regulation, which prohibited them from playing in
interscholastic athletic contests with boys. Id at 1207. In response, Judge Keith
enjoined the state agency promulgatingthe regulation from: 'Preventing or obstructing
in any way the individual plaintiffs or any other girls in the State of Michigan from
participating fully in varsity interscholastic athletics and athletic contests because of
their sex." Id at 1208. The Sixth Circuit modified Judge Keith's order to exclude
contact sports. Id at 1209.
In response to Judge Keith's ruling, Ms. Kent wrote the following,
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any other federal judge in the history of our nation.271 Where some
Judges have argued that they cannot find qualified law clerks of color,
Judge Keith has employed law clerks spanning the entire globe,
including Caucasian, Jewish, Chaldean, Ethiopian, Nigerian, Korean,
Indian, and African American. As a direct result of his tutelage, all of his
law clerks, regardless of race, ethnicity or gender, have inherited a legacy
of penetrating and sophisticated legal analysis, coupled with principled
commitment to justice and equality.272
As an example of Judge Keith's legacy and lived commitment to
equality, in her book Lft Every Voice,273 Harvard law professor Lani
Guinier recalls how one day in court, Judge Keith instructed a panel of
jurors to begin deliberations by choosing a foreman and a spokesman.274
Later, when Judge Keith returned to his chambers, there was a note on
his desk from one of his law clerks (Guinier) discreetly suggesting that
this esteemed, veteran jurist modify his language and use "foreperson"
or "spokesperson" next time because that might help jurors think about
I am writing this letter to invite you to lunch to thank you for a judgment you
made 25 years ago in Detroit. You may not remember it, but you enforced
Title IX with respect to two of my friends in Ann Arbor whose high school
did not have a girls' varsity tennis team. They sued, under Title IX, to be
allowed to play on the boys varsity team and won in your cou.. You later
approved making it a class action judgment. I attended the class action
hearing in downtown Detroit which was my first experience in a courtroom.
To make a long story short, after much pressure, my high school,
Grosse Pointe South, allowed me to play on the boys varsity te.an where I
earned my varsity letter. I later went to Wellesley College, University of
Michigan for business school and today am President of Global Marketing
and Product Development of Hasbro Corporation, a toy company.
Letter from Ginger Kent, President of Global Marketing and Product Development,
to Honorable DamonJ. Keith (June 18, 1997).
271. See Reginald M. Turner, Judge Damon J. Keith Honored with Ameican Bar
Assodation ThurgoodMarshallAward, 76 MICH. B.J. 790, 791 (Aug. 199"). In addition to
Professor Lani Guinier, the first tenured African American female Professor at
Harvard School of Law, Judge Keith's former clerks also include judge Eric L. Clay,
who currently serves with Judge Keith on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals; and
Jennifer Granholm, Attorney General for the State of Michigan.
272. See idl
273. LANI GUINIER, LIFr EVERY VOICE: TURNING A CIVIL RIGHTS SETBACK
INTO A NEW VISION OF SOCIALJUSTICE (1998).
274. See Trevor W. Coleman, Judge Keith Takes theLaw's Inght and Lets It Live Fdrp
forAll, DET. FREE PRESS, June 2, 1998, at 8A.
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selecting a woman.27 Some judges might have been indignant at such
a suggestion from a lowly clerk. Others might have dismissed it as an
ambitious young lawyer being hypersensitive or too politically correct.
NotJudge Keith. He took the advice and complimented Guinier on her
assertiveness.2 6 In reflecting on the incident, Guinier wrote "Judge
Keith tried to teach all his law clerks to respect the rule of law, 'but to
realize it is a changing thing.' That's why he liked my note: It showed
'sensitivity' and awareness of the need for change, even in our most
basic speaking."2'
Judge Keith's colleagues on the bench have also recognized his lived
commitment to equality. In presenting Judge Keith with the EdwardJ.
DevittAwardforDistinguishedSemice to Justice, which honors a federal judge
who has achieved an exemplary career and has made significant
contributions to the administration of justice, United States Circuit
Court of Appeals Judge Peter Fay noted:
One cannot be around Damon for very long without sensing
his commitment to all that is good about our country. But,
unlike many, he does not limit his commitments to words-his
actions speak volumes. He gets involved. He spends time. He
does work. Yes, he gets his hands "dirty" because there is
nothing he will not do if he is convinced it will help others and
strengthen our way of life.278
In addition to countless accolades from colleagues and practitioners,
275. See id
276. See id
277. See id.
278. Daily Briefing, DET. LEGAL NEWS, Mar. 25,1998. In yet another accolade,
civil rights leader and recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom, Oliver W. Hill,
Sr., writes the following ofJudge Keith in his autobiography THEBIG BANG THEORY:
I have enjoyed a close and longstanding friendship with Judge Damon
Keith of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit For
example, one of his early judicial opinions which was affirmed by the court
of appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court contributed to Nixon's exit from the
Presidency. In 1998, Damon won the prestigious Edward J. Devitt award
conferred by federal judges upon their colleagues. His forceful, thoughtful
and direct approach to legal issues confronting him as a jurist has made him
one of the greatest judges of this century.
OLVER W. HILL, SR., THE BIG BANG 276 (2000).
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Judge Keith's most enduring legacy may be the "Damort J. Keith Law
Collection of African-American Legal History, Wayne State University,"
founded by Judge Keith. The collection, a central depository for the
nation's African-American legal history, documents the contributions
of Black lawyers and judges to the struggle for equality. 9 It contains the
substantial historical accomplishments of African-American lawyers and
judges with more than a century of records, documents, photographs,
personal papers, memorabilia, and interviews. In remtrking on the
purpose and importance of the collection, Judge Keith stated:
I can think of no other place in the world where researchers,
students, and others will be able to take advantage of a central
repository with more than a century of records, documents,
photographs, and personal papers that may have in many ways
impacted American lifestyles.'
I am finding it more and more significant that young
AfricanAmeicans are not familiar with the struggles that went
on years ago. They don't seem aware that they are now standing
on the shoulders of giants who sacrificed and went to jail for
their rights. We should have a depository where people can
come in and ask questions and have them answered."'
As further evidence of his triumph over hegemony, Judge Keith has
received numerous award and recognitions, including, but not limited
to:
1. Chairperson of the Michigan Civil Rights Commission 1964-
1967
2. President of the Detroit Housing Commission 1958-1967
3. In 1967, President Lyndon B.Johnson appointedJudge Keith
to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, where he was Chief Judge from 1975 to 1977.
4. From 1971 to 1990, Ebony Magazine selected Judge Keith as
279. The collection, which has raised well in excess of $2 million and has its own
archivists and director, is the only one of its kind in the country.280. Rhonda Bates-Rudd, Law Colection Honors DetroitJude, DET NEWS, Nov. 22,
1993, available at 1993 WL 6060136.
281. De Simone and Brand-Williams, note 57, at 14A.
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one of the "One Hundred Most Influential Black Americans."
5. In 1974, the Detroit Board of Education dedicated one of its
primary schools in judge Keith's honor, naming it "The Damon
J. Keith Elementary SchooL"
6. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter elevated Judge Keith to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
7. In 1976, Judge Keith traveled to the former Soviet Union to
show support for the Soviet Jewish Refusniks."2
8. "In 1985, ChiefJustice Warren Burger appointed Judge Keith
as the Chair of the Committee on the Bicentennial of the
Constitution of the Sixth Circuit Two years later, Chief Justice
William Rehnquist appointed him the National Chair of the
Judicial Conference Committee on the Bicentennial of the
Constitution. In 1990, President George Bush, in recognition of
Judge Keith's contributions to the development of
constitutional law, appointed him to the Commission on the
Bicentennial of the Constitution."
9. "Under Judge Keith's leadership, over three hundred Bill of
Rights plaques have been placed in courthouses and law schools
throughout the United States and Guam. In October 1991, the
Commission on the Bicentennial of the Constitution in
celebration of the Bill of Rights held a three-day conference that
included over 350 federal judges, the largest gathering of the
federal judiciary in American history. For his work as Chair of
the Judicial Conference Committee, Judge Keith received a
special resolution of commendation from the Judicial
Conference. He was also the Chair of the Fortieth Anniversary
Conference of Brown v. The Board of Edcation, held May 17-18,
1994 at the College of William Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of
Law."
10. 'Judge Keith's peers within the nation's leading civil rights
and service organizations have also recognized his devotion to
the Constitution and equality under law. In 1974, he was a
282. In reflecting on judge Keith's support of the SovietJewish Refusniks, Natan
Sharansky, a Refusnik leader and organizer, wrote "[y]our help and support ever since
we first met in Moscow all those years ago has been a vital part of the campaign which
has now succeeded in bringing me home." Letter from Natan SharanskyJuly 16,1986.
283. Littlejohn, supra note 40, at 335.
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recipient of the NAACP's prestigious Spingarn Medal. Other
Spingarn winners include: Justice Thurgood Mashall; Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr.; and the 'Mother of the Civil Rights
Movement,' Mrs. Rosa Parks. The Spingarn Award notes
particularly Judge Keith's decisions in the 'Keith Case' and the
'Detroit Edison Case', which in addition to providiRg new job
opportunities for Black workers, was, at the time, the largest
damage settlement in an employment discrimination case
against a single company."285
11. In 1988, he was the co-recipient with General Co.[in Powell
of the One Nation Award from the Patriots Foundation in
Washington, D.C. Also in 1988, Judge Keith received the
Distinguished Public Service Award of the Anti-Defamation
League ofB'nai B'rith for his humanitarianism and cormitment
to equality.
12. In 1992, the National Bar Association honored Judge Keith
with the C. Francis Stratford Award.
13. In 1997, Judge Keith received the American Bar
Association's Thurgood Marshall Award. The award, named in
honor of the late Supreme Court justice goes annually to a
nominee with a history of substantial and ].ong-term
contributions to the advancement of civil rights, civil liberties,
and human rights in the United States." 6 In naming Judge Keith
the recipient, the ABA said:
14. Judge Keith represents the best in the legal profession. His
work reflects incisive analysis of issues, principled application of
laws and the Constitution, passionate belief in the courts' role
in protecting civil rights, a commitment to community service
and, most significantly, an independence of mind to do what's
right that is at the core of his view of professional responsibility.
There is no better role model today for lawyers and law students
seeking to work for equal justice.
15. In 1998, Judge Keith received the Detroit Urban. League's
Distinguished Warrior Award. He also received the EdwardJ.
Devitt Award for Distinguished Service to Justice. The Devitt
285. Id at 336.
286. Jude Colkects Legal Honors For Eveyone To See, Service, D!r. FREE PRESS,
May 11, 1997, at 5E.
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Award annually honors a federal judge who has achieved an
exemplary career and has made significant contributions to the
administration of justice, the advancement of the rule of law,
and the improvement of society as a whole. In addition, the
Damon J. Keith Law Collection of African-American Legal
History founded the Marching TowardJustice exhibit, a tribute
to Justice Thurgood Marshall. The exhibit informs the public
about the fundamental importance of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the ongoing quest to realize equality. 87 The
exhibit chronicles the United States history of promoting justice
and equality for some, while condoning the enslavement of
others. As the exhibit demonstrates, although the philosophy of
"justice and equality for all" is the founding principle of the
nation, in practice, the nation long denied due process and equal
protection to African Americans under the law.
16. In 2000, Judge Keith received the Turner Broadcasting
Systems Trumpet Award, for those African Americans whose
achievements in their fields, coupled with their humanitarian
and community-oriented efforts, have helped create a better
society.
17. As of the publishing of this Article, Judge Keith has received 38
honorary degrees from colleges and universities across the country.
In sumJudge Keith's experiences ofmarginalization have informed
a jurisprudence that not only acts as a check on race and gender
equality, but also on the abuse of power by a government toward all of
its citizens. Rather than catering to only a narrow set of interests, Judge
Keith has participated in securing the rights of all citizens. His
sensitivity toward justice has set a shining example for both colleagues
and practitioners alike. Judge Keith's example has not gone unnoticed.
287. On February 3, 1999, the exhibit opened at the Thurgood Marshall Federal
JudiciaryBuildingin Washington D.C. PresidentBill Clinton, Mrs. Thurgood Marshall,
and Rosa Parks were all in attendance. It then traveled to New York City, New York;
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Newark, NewJersey. In 2000, it traveled to Harvard
University in Cambridge, Massachusetts and Cleveland, Ohio. Also in 2000, it toured
both Los Angeles and San Francisco, California. In 2001, the exhibit toured Chicago,
Illinois at the Museum ofScience and Industry; Topeka, Kansas; Dallas, Texas; Kansas
City, Missouri; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; and St. Croix, Virgin Islands. On May 17,2002,
the exhibit opened at Vanderbilt University.
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IX. CONCLUSION
Unlike judges who deny as judges that which they ]mow as men,
Judge Keith has resisted the fallacy of distorting social reality when
fashioning legal formula. Instead, he has developed a method of legal
adjudication that gives facts meaning by contextualizing them within
their historical context, and specifically in the relevant history of power
imbalance. At a time when just about all civil rights groups, poor people
and people of color absolutely fear going into the federal courts for
relief from injustice and bias, Judge Keith's legacy reminds us of his
tireless and effective struggle for equality. In describing his unyielding
commitment to equality, Judge Keith often quotes Edwin Hall
I am only one, but still I am one.
I cannot do everything, but I can do something, and because I
cannot do everything,
I will not refuse to do what I can.
Judge Keith's legacy offers insight into the heart and mind of an
individual whose lived experiences of racist hegemony have informed
an acute sensitivity toward power and justice. He has remined steadfast
in his belief that the United States belongs to all its citizens-regardless
of race, gender, class, religion, or background. Throughout his career,
Judge Keith has held high this light of basic, simple justice for all. He
has brought honor on the system he serves. Both his life and legal
legacy breathes life into the immortal words etched in marble on the
United States Supreme Courthouse-"equal justice under law." Judge
Keith's tenure as a federal judge has been devoted to making those
words a reality for everyone.
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